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Voter Response to Peak and End Transfers: Evidence from a Conditional Cash Transfer Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Sebastian Galiani
  • Nadya Hajj
  • Patrick J. McEwan
  • Pablo Ibarrarán
  • Nandita Krishnaswamy

Abstract

In a Honduran field experiment, sequences of cash transfers to poor households varied in amount of the largest (peak) and last (end) transfers. Larger peak-end transfers increased voter turnout and the incumbent party's vote share in the 2013 presidential election, independently of cumulative transfers. A plausible explanation is that voters succumbed to a common cognitive bias by applying peak-end heuristics. Another is that voters deliberately used peak-end transfers to update beliefs about the incumbent party. In either case, the results provide experimental evidence on the classic non-experimental finding that voters are especially sensitive to recent economic activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Galiani & Nadya Hajj & Patrick J. McEwan & Pablo Ibarrarán & Nandita Krishnaswamy, 2019. "Voter Response to Peak and End Transfers: Evidence from a Conditional Cash Transfer Experiment," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 232-260, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:11:y:2019:i:3:p:232-60
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170448
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Electoral reciprocity in programmatic redistribution: Experimental Evidence
      by maximorossi in NEP-LTV blog on 2016-09-28 23:34:33

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    Cited by:

    1. Ankush Goyal & Rajender Kumar, 2022. "Does Social Welfare Programmes Influence Households Trust in Local Administration and Their Political Participation? Evidence from the MGNREG Scheme in India," Indian Journal of Human Development, , vol. 16(3), pages 602-617, December.
    2. Lehmann, M. Christian & Matarazzo, Hellen, 2019. "Voters’ response to in-kind transfers: Quasi-experimental evidence from prescription drug cost-sharing in Brazil," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    3. Loewenthal, Amit & Miaari, Sami H. & Hoeffler, Anke, 2021. "Aid and Radicalization: The Case of Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza," IZA Discussion Papers 14265, IZA Network @ LISER.
    4. Adrienne M. Lucas & Patrick J. McEwan & David Torres Irribarra, 2025. "The Long-Run and Intergenerational Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers: Evidence from Chile’s Indigenous Grants," NBER Working Papers 33798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Lamberova, Natalia, 2021. "The puzzling politics of R&D: Signaling competence through risky projects," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 801-818.
    6. Michael Lokshin & Aylén Rodriguez‐Ferrari & Iván Torre, 2024. "Electoral cycles and public spending during the pandemic," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 1077-1107, August.
    7. Gutiérrez, Emilio & Meriläinen, Jaakko & Ponce de León, Máximo, 2024. "Worth a shot? The political economy of government responsiveness in times of crisis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    8. Zekai Shen & Yiyang Jin & Yuanyuan Dong & Yazhou Liu, 2024. "Economic voting behavior: The peak‐end growth rule," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 1537-1571, November.
    9. Jiménez, Bruno, 2023. "The Political economy of the minimum wage," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    10. Duchoslav, Jan & Kenamu, Edwin & Thunde, Jack, 2023. "Targeting hunger or votes? The political economy of humanitarian transfers in Malawi," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    11. Felix Kersting, 2022. "Welfare Reform and Repression in an Autocracy: Bismarck and the Socialists," Working Papers 0227, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    12. Felix Kersting, 2023. "Mimicking the Opposition: Bismarck's Welfare State and the Rise of the Socialists," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 448, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    13. Alexander James & Nathaly Rivera & Brock Smith, 2022. "Cash Transfers and Voter Turnout," Working Papers 2022-01, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I32 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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