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The Euro Area’s Common Pool Problem Revisited: Has the Single Supervisory Mechanism Ameliorated Forbearance and Evergreening?

Author

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  • Sven Steinkamp

    (University Osnabrueck)

  • Aaron Tornell

    (UC Los Angeles)

  • Frank Westermann

    (University Osnabrueck)

Abstract

The Single Supervisory Mechanism was introduced to eliminate the common-pool problem and limit uncontrolled lending by national central banks (NCBs). We analyze its effectiveness. Second, we model how, by forbearing and providing refinancing credit, NCBs avoid domestic resolution costs and, instead, share potential losses within the Euro Area. This results in “evergreening” of bad loans. Third, we construct a new evergreening index based on a large worldwide survey administered by the ifo institute. Regressions show evergreening is significantly greater in the Euro Area and where banks are in distress. Finally, greater evergreening accompanies higher growth of NCB-credit and Target2-liabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Sven Steinkamp & Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann, 2017. "The Euro Area’s Common Pool Problem Revisited: Has the Single Supervisory Mechanism Ameliorated Forbearance and Evergreening?," IEER Working Papers 107, Institute of Empirical Economic Research, Osnabrueck University, revised 06 Oct 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:iee:wpaper:wp0107
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    Cited by:

    1. Steiner, Andreas & Steinkamp, Sven & Westermann, Frank, 2019. "Exit strategies, capital flight and speculative attacks: Europe's version of the trilemma," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 83-96.
    2. Stefan Homburg, 2019. "Speculative Eurozone Attacks and Departure Strategies," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 65(1), pages 1-15.
    3. Sinn Hans-Werner, 2019. "Der Streit um die Targetsalden : Kommentar zu Martin Hellwigs Artikel „Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle?“," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 20(3), pages 170-217, September.
    4. Iryna Okolelova & Jacob Bikker, 2018. "The Single Supervisory Mechanism: competitive implications for the banking sectors in the euro area," DNB Working Papers 621, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    5. Sven Steinkamp & Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann, 2018. "Evergreening in the Euro Area: Facts and Explanation," IEER Working Papers 113, Institute of Empirical Economic Research, Osnabrueck University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Single Supervisory Mechanism; Evergreening; Non-performing Loans; Common-pool Problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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