The Euro Area’s Common Pool Problem Revisited: Has the Single Supervisory Mechanism Ameliorated Forbearance and Evergreening?
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- Sven Steinkamp & Aaron Tornell & Frank Westermann, 2017. "The Euro Area's Common Pool Problem Revisited: Has the Single Supervisory Mechanism Ameliorated Forbearance and Evergreening," CESifo Working Paper Series 6670, CESifo Group Munich.
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- Andreas Steiner & Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2017.
"Exit Strategies, Capital Flight and Speculative Attacks: Europe's Version of the Trilemma,"
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6753, CESifo Group Munich.
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More about this item
KeywordsSingle Supervisory Mechanism; Evergreening; Non-performing Loans; Common-pool Problem;
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-10-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2017-10-01 (Central Banking)
- NEP-EEC-2017-10-01 (European Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2017-10-01 (Macroeconomics)
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