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Speculative Eurozone Attacks and Departure Strategies

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  • Stefan Homburg

Abstract

This article shows that the eurozone payment system does not effectively protect member states from speculative attacks. Suspicion of a departure from the common currency induces a terminal outflow of central bank money in weaker member states. TARGET2 cannot inhibit this drain but only protects central bank assets. Evidence presented here suggests that a run on Italy is already on the way. The article also considers departure strategies of strong and weak member states and the distributive effects of an orderly eurozone dissolution. (JEL codes: E52, E58, and F45)

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Homburg, 2019. "Speculative Eurozone Attacks and Departure Strategies," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 65(1), pages 1-15.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:65:y:2019:i:1:p:1-15.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ify029
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    1. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target loans, current account balances and capital flows: the ECB’s rescue facility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 468-508, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Steiner, Andreas & Steinkamp, Sven & Westermann, Frank, 2019. "Exit strategies, capital flight and speculative attacks: Europe's version of the trilemma," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 83-96.
    2. Heikki Oksanen, 2019. "Reforming the Euro Pragmatically: Towards Sustainable Fiscal Policy and a Revamped Eurosystem," CESifo Working Paper Series 7912, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    : currency speculation; TARGET2; eurozone; Italexit; Dexit; trilemma;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F45 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions

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