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How Category Reporting Can Improve Fundraising

  • Cartwright, Edward


    (Dept of Economics, University of Kent)

  • Patel, Amrish


    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

Many fundraisers report donations using categories such as more than £ 1000, more than £ 10,000 etc. One naturally wonders how we should categorise donations and whether category reporting can raise more funds than simple uncategorised reporting. To shed light on these questions, we employ a signalling game framework in which both the donor’s donation and his bene…ts of being in a higher category are determined endogenously.Our analysis suggests that categorised reporting can always improve fundraising. Indeed, we show that both a high and a low category threshold can increase donations. Categorised reporting, especially with a high threshold, can though also lead to the existence of a low donation equilibrium. Fundraisers may then have to choose between: a safer low threshold and a potentially more lucrative high threshold where they would also have to try to coordinate individuals on the desirable equilibrium.

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Paper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 522.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 04 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0522
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
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