IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01430375.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

L’euro, le bourdon et le banquier central

Author

Listed:
  • Ludovic Desmedt

    (LEDi - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dijon - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Matthieu Llorca

    (LEDi - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dijon - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Cet article s'interroge sur les raisons de la montée en puissance de la politique de communication des banques centrales, notamment celle de la BCE. Nous commençons par présenter les arguments mis en avant par la théorie économique standard, qui justifie à la fois l'indépendance des Banques Centrales (à l'égard du pouvoir politique) et le «gouvernement des anticipations» des agents économiques. Les thèmes de la transparence, de la crédibilité et de l'indépendance ont été associés au cours des années 1980, aboutissant à la nécessité de mettre en place des banquiers centraux «conservateurs», c'est-à-dire hostiles à l'inflation. Cette littérature a influencé les pratiques, notamment celles de la BCE en matière de communication. Nous revenons ensuite sur certains «actes de langage» de la BCE en étudiant les procédures et les outils employés. Nous évoquons en particulier la répercussion des discours au moment de la mise en œuvre de la politique d'assouplissement quantitatif (quantitative easing). Il ressort au final que la crise financière débutée en 2008 a augmenté l'audience du discours des banquiers centraux, tout en réduisant paradoxalement leur degré d'indépendance.

Suggested Citation

  • Ludovic Desmedt & Matthieu Llorca, 2016. "L’euro, le bourdon et le banquier central," Post-Print hal-01430375, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01430375
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://u-bourgogne.hal.science/hal-01430375
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://u-bourgogne.hal.science/hal-01430375/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frederic S Mishkin, 2004. "Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Christopher Kent & Simon Guttmann (ed.),The Future of Inflation Targeting, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    2. Ben S. Bernanke & Vincent R. Reinhart & Brian P. Sack, 2004. "Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 35(2), pages 1-100.
    3. Alan S. Blinder, 2008. "Talking about Monetary Policy: The Virtues (and Vices?) of Central Bank Communication," Working Papers 1048, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    4. Blancheton, Bertrand, 2016. "Central bank independence in a historical perspective. Myth, lessons and a new model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PA), pages 101-107.
    5. Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2009. "The communication policy of the European Central Bank: An overview of the first decade," DNB Working Papers 212, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    6. Ben S. Bernanke & Vincent R. Reinhart, 2004. "Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 85-90, May.
    7. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    8. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    9. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
    10. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/2967 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central bank communication and policy effectiveness," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 399-474.
    12. Jérôme Creel & Jacky Fayolle, 2002. "La Banque Centrale Européenne ou le Seigneur des euros," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(5), pages 175-210.
    13. Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December.
    14. Guthrie, Graeme & Wright, Julian, 2000. "Open mouth operations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 489-516, October.
    15. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-538, June.
    16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3004 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Michel De Vroey & Pierre Malgrange, 2007. "Théorie et modélisation macro-économiques, d'hier à aujourd'hui," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 21(3), pages 3-38.
    18. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    19. Carlo Rosa & Giovanni Verga, 2005. "Is ECB Communication Effective?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0682, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    20. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    21. Otmar Issing, 2005. "Communication, transparency, accountability: monetary policy in the twenty-first century," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 87(Mar), pages 65-83.
    22. Ales Bulír & Martin Cihák & David-Jan Jansen, 2011. "Clarity of Central Bank Communication About Inflation," DNB Working Papers 333, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    23. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/3004 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Forrest Capie & Geoffrey Wood, 2013. "Central Bank Independence: A Victim of the Crisis?," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 379-385, October.
    25. Gerlach, Stefan, 2004. "Interest Rate Setting by the ECB: Words and Deeds," CEPR Discussion Papers 4775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    26. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
    27. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2967 is not listed on IDEAS
    28. L. Randall Wray & Mathew Forstater (ed.), 2006. "Money, Financial Instability and Stabilization Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3902.
    29. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    30. Bertrand Blancheton, 2016. "Central bank independence in a historical perspective. Myth, lessons and a new model," Post-Print hal-03124884, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    2. Ngomba Bodi, Francis Ghislain & Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Soulemanou, Soulemanou, 2020. "Transparence des Banques Centrales et efficacité de la politique monétaire : quelles implications pour la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale ? [Central Bank's Transparency and effectiveness of ," MPRA Paper 116436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli & Gaia Rubera, 2021. "Monetary policy and financial markets: evidence from Twitter traffic," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21160, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5221 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2007. "The timing of central bank communication," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 124-145, March.
    6. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    7. Helder Ferreira de Mendonça & Ivando Faria, 2015. "Brazilian Central Bank communication and interest rate expectations," Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1-2), pages 25-44, July.
    8. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5221 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2007. "Communication by Central Bank Committee Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(2‐3), pages 509-541, March.
    10. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli & Gaia Rubera, 2021. "Monetary policy, Twitter and financial markets: evidence from social media traffic," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21160, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Sheila Dow & Matthias Klaes & Alberto Montagnoli, 2009. "Risk And Uncertainty In Central Bank Signals: An Analysis Of Monetary Policy Committee Minutes," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 584-618, November.
    12. Ferrara, Federico M. & Masciandaro, Donato & Moschella, Manuela & Romelli, Davide, 2022. "Political voice on monetary policy: Evidence from the parliamentary hearings of the European Central Bank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    13. Trunin, Pavel (Трунин, Павел) & Bozhechkova, Alexandra (Божечкова, Александра) & Goryunov, Eugene (Горюнов, Евгений) & Petrova, Diana, 2017. "Analysis of Approaches to Accounting of the Information Effects of Monetary Policy [Анализ Подходов К Учету Информационных Эффектов Денежно-Кредитной Политики]," Working Papers 031723, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    14. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2016. "From Silence to Voice: Monetary Policy, Central Bank Governance and Communication," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1627, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    15. Man-Keung Tang & Mr. Xiangrong Yu, 2011. "Communication of Central Bank Thinking and Inflation Dynamics," IMF Working Papers 2011/209, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Aleš Bulíř & Martin Čihák & David-Jan Jansen, 2013. "What Drives Clarity of Central Bank Communication About Inflation?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 125-145, February.
    17. Petra Geraats, 2014. "Monetary Policy Transparency," CESifo Working Paper Series 4611, CESifo.
    18. Helge Berger & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2011. "Monetary Policy in the Media," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(4), pages 689-709, June.
    19. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    20. van der Cruijsen, Carin A.B. & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W., 2010. "From actual to perceived transparency: The case of the European Central Bank," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 388-399, June.
    21. Sorge, Marco M., 2013. "Robust delegation with uncertain monetary policy preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 73-78.
    22. Hubert, Paul & Labondance, Fabien, 2021. "The signaling effects of central bank tone," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01430375. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.