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Central bank independence in a historical perspective. Myth, lessons and a new model

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  • Blancheton, Bertrand

Abstract

This article puts the independence of central banks into historical perspective. In doing so, it underlines the highly versatile nature of the balance of forces between central banks and governments. From this viewpoint, the situation of public finances emerges as a key explanatory factor, and an analysis of the sequence of central banking models is proposed from the late 19th century to the present day. The article upholds the thesis of the emergence, since the subprime crisis, of a new model qualified as “tacit low-degree independence”: central banks have, of their own volition, given up some of their de facto independence, helping governments to contain the rise in national debt. But while keeping a step ahead of pressure from governments, they have lost the control of money supply.

Suggested Citation

  • Blancheton, Bertrand, 2016. "Central bank independence in a historical perspective. Myth, lessons and a new model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PA), pages 101-107.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:52:y:2016:i:pa:p:101-107
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2015.02.027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(03), pages 259-289, December.
    2. Stephanos Papadamou & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2017. "Is There a Role for Central Bank Independence on Public Debt Dynamics?," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 7(1), pages 1-6.
    3. repec:men:journl:v:3:y:2017:i:1:p:21-28 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:eee:riibaf:v:42:y:2017:i:c:p:855-864 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Papadamou, Stephanos & Sidiropoulos, Moïse & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2017. "Does central bank independence affect stock market volatility?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 855-864.
    6. Martínez-Ruiz, Elena & Nogues-Marco, Pilar, 2017. "The political economy of exchange rate stability during the gold standard. The case of Spain, 1874-1914," Working Papers unige:91510, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.
    7. Stephanos Papadamou & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 0. "Is There a Role for Central Bank Independence on Public Debt Dynamics?," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 0, pages 6.
    8. repec:lrk:eeaart:36_1_5 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Ludovic Desmedt & Matthieu Llorca, 2016. "L’euro, le bourdon et le banquier central," Post-Print hal-01430375, HAL.
    10. repec:eee:ecmode:v:67:y:2017:i:c:p:215-227 is not listed on IDEAS

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