Central Bank Independence: A Victim of the Crisis?
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Thorvald Grung Moe, 2013. "Marriner S. Eccles and the 1951 Treasury–Federal Reserve Accord: Lessons for Central Bank Independence," Chapters in SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
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- Blancheton, Bertrand, 2016. "Central bank independence in a historical perspective. Myth, lessons and a new model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PA), pages 101-107.
- Ludovic Desmedt & Matthieu Llorca, 2016. "L’euro, le bourdon et le banquier central," Post-Print hal-01430375, HAL.
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