Barro-Gordon Revisited: Reputational Equilibria with Inferential Expectations
We incorporate inferential expectations into the Barro-Gordon model (1983a) of time inconsistency and consider reputational equilibria. The range of sustainable equilibria shrinks as the private sector becomes more belief-conservative.
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CAMA Working Papers
2005-12, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
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NBER Working Papers
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