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From actual to perceived transparency: The case of the European Central Bank

  • van der Cruijsen, Carin A.B.
  • Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W.

Over the last decades central banks have become much more transparent about their monetary policy making process. In the literature, the increase in central bank transparency has frequently been related to (changes in) the actions of economic actors. However, the fact that these actors might not even be aware of the increased transparency or might not perceive the central bank as any more credible or transparent as a result of it is neglected in the literature. By analyzing data of a Dutch household survey on the (perceived) transparency of the European Central Bank (ECB) we delve into those neglected issues. We find that transparency perceptions matter for inflation perceptions and expectations as well as for trust in the ECB. However, we also show that the link between actual and perceived transparency is weak. Not only because of poor transparency knowledge but also because perceived transparency is influenced by many individual and psychological characteristics.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Psychology.

Volume (Year): 31 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 388-399

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Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:3:p:388-399
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