IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/joepsy/v31y2010i3p388-399.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

From actual to perceived transparency: The case of the European Central Bank

Author

Listed:
  • van der Cruijsen, Carin A.B.
  • Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W.

Abstract

Over the last decades central banks have become much more transparent about their monetary policy making process. In the literature, the increase in central bank transparency has frequently been related to (changes in) the actions of economic actors. However, the fact that these actors might not even be aware of the increased transparency or might not perceive the central bank as any more credible or transparent as a result of it is neglected in the literature. By analyzing data of a Dutch household survey on the (perceived) transparency of the European Central Bank (ECB) we delve into those neglected issues. We find that transparency perceptions matter for inflation perceptions and expectations as well as for trust in the ECB. However, we also show that the link between actual and perceived transparency is weak. Not only because of poor transparency knowledge but also because perceived transparency is influenced by many individual and psychological characteristics.

Suggested Citation

  • van der Cruijsen, Carin A.B. & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W., 2010. "From actual to perceived transparency: The case of the European Central Bank," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 388-399, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:3:p:388-399
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-4870(10)00014-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 910-945.
    2. Fischer, Justina AV & Hahn, Volker, 2008. "Determinants of Trust in the European Central Bank," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 695, Stockholm School of Economics.
    3. John Hudson, 2006. "Institutional Trust and Subjective Well-Being across the EU," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 43-62, February.
    4. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
    5. Robert J. Shiller, 1997. "Why Do People Dislike Inflation?," NBER Chapters,in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 13-70 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, 2005. "CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2661-2700, December.
    7. Jakob Haan & Fabian Amtenbrink & Sandra Waller, 2004. "The Transparency and Credibility of the European Central Bank," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 775-794, November.
    8. van Rooij, Maarten & Lusardi, Annamaria & Alessie, Rob, 2011. "Financial literacy and stock market participation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, pages 449-472.
    9. Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December.
    10. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
    11. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
    12. Linda Babcock & Xianghong Wang & George Loewenstein, 1996. "Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in Negotiations That Reflect a Self-Serving Bias," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 1-19.
    13. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central bank communication and policy effectiveness," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 399-474.
    14. Erik Angner, 2006. "Economists as experts: Overconfidence in theory and practice," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 1-24.
    15. Helge Berger & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2011. "Monetary Policy in the Media," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(4), pages 689-709, June.
    16. Céline Christensen & Peter Els & Maarten Rooij, 2006. "Dutch Households’ Perceptions of Economic Growth and Inflation," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 277-294, June.
    17. repec:use:tkiwps:2323 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?," NBER Working Papers 13003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Matthew Rabin, 1998. "Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
    20. Ranyard, Rob & Missier, Fabio Del & Bonini, Nicolao & Duxbury, Darren & Summers, Barbara, 2008. "Perceptions and expectations of price changes and inflation: A review and conceptual framework," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 378-400, August.
    21. Kilduff, Martin & Crossland, Craig & Tsai, Wenpin & Krackhardt, David, 2008. "Organizational network perceptions versus reality: A small world after all?," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 15-28, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. van der Cruijsen, Carin A.B. & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Hoogduin, Lex H., 2010. "Optimal central bank transparency," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(8), pages 1482-1507, December.
    2. Hayo, Bernd & Neuenkirch, Edith, 2014. "The German public and its trust in the ECB: The role of knowledge and information search," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, pages 286-303.
    3. van der Cruijsen, Carin & de Haan, Jakob & Jansen, David-Jan & Mosch, Robert, 2013. "Knowledge and opinions about banking supervision: Evidence from a survey of Dutch households," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, pages 219-229.
    4. Bernd Hayo & Ummad Mazhar, 2014. "Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement, Determinants, and Economic Effects," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 739-770, September.
    5. Francesco Cendron & Gianfranco Tusset, 2014. "Central BanksÕ Transparency: Words as Signals," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0178, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    6. Neuenkirch, Edith & Hayo, Bernd, 2015. "The influence of media use on laymen s monetary policy knowledge in Germany," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113218, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Ehrmann, Michael & Soudan, Michel & Stracca, Livio, 2012. "Explaining EU Citizens' Trust in the ECB in Normal and Crisis Times," Economics Series 289, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    8. repec:taf:applec:v:48:y:2016:i:57:p:5625-5638 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Ummad Mazhar, 2013. "Does Greater Transparency Stabilize Output? Evidence from Panel Data," SBP Working Paper Series 59, State Bank of Pakistan, Research Department.
    10. Roman Horvath & Dominika Katuscakova, 2016. "Transparency and trust: the case of the European Central Bank," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(57), pages 5625-5638, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:3:p:388-399. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.