The Fundamental Privatization Theorem: Ideology, Evolution, Practice
The article focuses on the analysis of the evolution of contemporary theoretic approaches to the choice of an optimal form of ownership, and the corresponding estimation of privatization in the context of the advantages and disadvantages of the public and private sectors of the national economy. Various interpretations of the fundamental privatization theorem are considered: based on the principal-agent relationship; based on the comparison of the structure of information flows; the combination of ownership rights and contractual rights; consideration of sociopolitical factors, etc. The latest trends in Russia’s de-statization policy in 2010-2013 are analyzed in the context of ‘reluctant privatization’, with special emphasis on the asymmetry between the statization and privatization processes.
|Date of creation:||2014|
|Date of revision:||2014|
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