Приватизация И Рациональная Структура Собственности. Часть 1. Приватизация: Проблема Эффективности
[Privatization and the rational ownership structure. Part 1: privatization: the effeciency problem]
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More about this item
KeywordsSappington – Stiglitz theorem; transformation cost; quality of state governance; quality of market; rational ownership structure;
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D04 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation
- E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
- O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- P5 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems
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