Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes
In this paper we challenge the conventional view that strikes are caused by asymmetric information regarding firm profitability such that union members are uninformed. Instead, we build an expressive model of strikes where the perception of unfairness provides the expressive benefit of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage offers and the incidence of strikes. Furthermore, while asymmetric information is still important in causing strikes, we find that it is the employer who is not fully informed about the level of emotionality within the union, thereby contributing to strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a positive effect on the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions even when asymmetric information regarding profitability is controlled for.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Zürichbergstrasse 18, ZUE, CH-8092 Zürich|
Phone: +41 44 632 03 87
Fax: +41 44 632 13 62
Web page: http://www.cer.ethz.ch
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2011.
"Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications,"
British Journal of Political Science,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(03), pages 645-670, July.
- Alan Hamlin & Colin Jennings, 2009. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications," Working Papers 0918, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
- Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2009. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications," SIRE Discussion Papers 2009-41, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- M. Rabin, 2001.
"Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
511, David K. Levine.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
- Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
- James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman, 2004. "What Do Unions Do?: A Twenty-Year Perspective," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, vol. 25(3), pages 339-350, July.
- Glazer, A., 1989.
"An Expressive Voting Theory Of Strikes,"
89-4, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- John Godard, 1992. "Strikes as Collective Voice: A Behavioral Analysis of Strike Activity," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 46(1), pages 161-175, October.
- Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
- Andrew Gelman & Nate Silver & Aaron Edlin, 2012. "What Is The Probability Your Vote Will Make A Difference?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 321-326, 04.
- Peter Ingram & David Metcalf & Jonathan Wadsworth, 1993. "Strike Incidence in British Manufacturing in the 1980s," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 46(4), pages 704-717, July.
- Ashenfelter, Orley & Johnson, George E, 1969. "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 35-49, March.
- Andrew Gelman & Nate Silver & Aaron Edlin, 2009. "What is the probability your vote will make a difference?," NBER Working Papers 15220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:12-162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.