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The Emergence and Evolution of Social Pacts: A Provisional Framework for Comparative Analysis

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  • Avdagic, Sabina
  • Rhodes, Martin
  • Visser, Jelle

Abstract

This paper provides the scientific framework for the NEWGOV project Distributive Politics, Learning and Reform. In Part I, we establish our own definition and conceptualization of social pacts. We distinguish four types of pacts with different scope and depth: shadow pacts, headline pacts, coordinated wage setting, and embedded pacts akin to neocorporatist concertation. Part II is concerned with institutional formation, i.e. how such social pacts come into existence. We outline some standard functionalist accounts of institutional emergence, and critically examine them before proposing an alternative bargaining model. Part III is concerned with institutional development, i.e. what determines the continuation and institutionalization of social pacts or their de-institutionalization and demise. Based on the taxonomy of social pacts presented in Part I, we define two alternative evolutionary paths for social pacts (institutionalization and de-institutionalization), and identify three types of trajectory along which social pacts develop (repetition vs. abandonment; integration vs. disintegration; and expansion vs. reduction). We then outline four alternative mechanisms that may potentially drive the institutionalization or de-institutionalization of pacts. Grounded in the four major approaches for analysing institutions, i.e. the functionalist, utilitarian, normative, and power-distributional perspectives, this section proposes four groups of hypotheses to be evaluated in our empirical research.

Suggested Citation

  • Avdagic, Sabina & Rhodes, Martin & Visser, Jelle, 2005. "The Emergence and Evolution of Social Pacts: A Provisional Framework for Comparative Analysis," European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) 1, CONNEX and EUROGOV networks.
  • Handle: RePEc:erp:eurogo:p0008
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Bartolomeo, 2013. "The Cost Of Social Pacts," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 238-255, July.
    2. Tanya Araújo & Miguel St. Aubyn, 2008. "Education, Neighborhood Effects And Growth: An Agent-Based Model Approach," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(01), pages 99-117.
    3. Köhler, Holm-Detlev & Calleja Jiménez, José Pablo, 2018. "Soziale Bewegungen und gewerkschaftliche Erneuerung in Spanien [Social movements and trade union revitalization in Spain]," Industrielle Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management, Verlag Barbara Budrich, vol. 25(2), pages 147-165.

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    Keywords

    comparative public policy; political economy; sociological institutionalism; corporatism; policy learning; policy networks; organization theory; interest intermediation;
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