Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes
We investigate the outcome of bargaining when a player’s pay-off from agreement is risky. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because the presence of risk makes individuals behave 'more patiently' in bargaining. Strong analogies are drawn to the precautionary saving literature. We show that the effect of risk on receipts can be sufficiently strong that a decreasingly risk-averse player may be better off receiving a risky pay-off than a certain pay-off.
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