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The Ultimatum Game and the Law of Demand

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  • Telser, L G

Abstract

This note shows that experimental results of the ultimatum game are consistent with and can be explained by the law of demand. Salaries of major league baseball players and estimates of their net marginal revenue while the reserve clause was in effect impressively confirm this assertion. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Telser, L G, 1995. "The Ultimatum Game and the Law of Demand," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(433), pages 1519-1523, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:105:y:1995:i:433:p:1519-23
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    Cited by:

    1. Frank, Bjorn, 1998. "Good news for experimenters: subjects do not care about your welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 171-174, November.
    2. Srinivas K. Reddy & Antonie Stam & Per J. Agrell, 2015. "Brand Equity, Efficiency and Valuation of Professional Sports Franchises: The Case of Major League Baseball," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 5(1), pages 63-89, January.
    3. Andreas Nicklisch, 2004. "Express Yourself: The Price of Fairness in a Simple Distribution Game," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-36, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    4. Hopp, Daniel, 2021. "High incentives without high cost: The role of (perceived) stake sizes in dictator games," CAWM Discussion Papers 123, University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP).
    5. Pelnar, Gregory, 2007. "Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues," MPRA Paper 5382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Bühren, Christoph & Frank, Björn & Krabel, Stefan & Werner, Alexander, 2012. "Decision-making in competitive framings—Strategic behavior of chess players in mini-ultimatum game chess puzzles," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 356-358.
    7. Rami Zwick & Xiao-Ping Chen, 1999. "What Price Fairness? A Bargaining Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(6), pages 804-823, June.
    8. Martijn J. van den Assem & Dennie van Dolder & Richard H. Thaler, 2012. "Split or Steal? Cooperative Behavior When the Stakes Are Large," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 2-20, January.
    9. White, Lucy, 2008. "Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 211-231, January.
    10. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
    11. White, Lucy, 2006. "Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Somya Arora, 2021. "Why Are Downward-Sloping Demand Curves Unrealistic? A Critical Review of Factors Influencing Demand in More Realistic Scenario-I," Journal of Studies in Dynamics and Change (JSDC), ISSN: 2348-7038, Voices of Inclusive Change and Expressions- (VOICE) Trust, Dehradun, Uttarakhand, vol. 8(4), pages 1-16, October-D.
    13. Hopp, Daniel, 2022. "High incentives without high cost - The role of (perceived) stake sizes in dictator games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    14. Jinkwon Lee, 2007. "Repetition And Financial Incentives In Economics Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 628-681, July.
    15. Somya Arora, 2022. "Why Are Downward-Sloping Demand Curves Unrealistic? A Critical Review of Factors Influencing Demand in More Realistic Scenario-II," Journal of Studies in Dynamics and Change (JSDC), ISSN: 2348-7038, Voices of Inclusive Change and Expressions- (VOICE) Trust, Dehradun, Uttarakhand, vol. 9(1), pages 1-11, January-M.

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