Decision-making in competitive framings—Strategic behavior of chess players in mini-ultimatum game chess puzzles
We introduce a competitive framing in the mini-ultimatum game utilizing chess puzzles. Therein, our chess playing participants accept low offers significantly more often compared to a neutral framing. We conclude that in familiar competitive surroundings egoistic behavior is more acceptable.
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