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Is a “Firm” a Firm? A Stackelberg Experiment

  • Andreas Hildenbrand

    ()

    (University of Giessen)

Industrial organization is mainly concerned with the behavior of large firms. Experimental industrial organization therefore faces a problem: How can firms be brought into the laboratory? The main approach relies on framing: Call individuals “firms”! This experimental approach is not in line with modern industrial organization, according to which a firm’s market behavior is also determined by its organizational structure. In this paper, a Stackelberg experiment is considered in order to answer the question whether framing individual decision making as organizational decision making or implementing an organizational structure is more effective in generating profit-maximizing behavior. Firms are either represented by individuals or by teams. I find that teams’ quantity choices are more in line with the assumption of profit maximization than individuals’

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File URL: https://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/29-2012_hildenbrand.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
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Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201229.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201229
Contact details of provider: Postal: Universitätsstraße 25, 35037 Marburg
Phone: 06421/28-1722
Fax: 06421/28-4858
Web page: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/
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