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Organization of the state: home assignment and bureaucrat performance

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Listed:
  • Xu, Guo
  • Bertrand, Marianne
  • Burgess, Robin

Abstract

How to allocate personnel is a central question in the organization of the state. We link survey data on the performance of 1471 elite civil servants in India to their personnel records between 1975 and 2005 to study how home allocations affect their performance and careers. Using exogenous variation in home assignment generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home states are perceived to be less effective and more likely to be suspended. These negative effects are driven by states with higher levels of corruption and cohorts with greater numbers of home state officers.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Guo & Bertrand, Marianne & Burgess, Robin, 2023. "Organization of the state: home assignment and bureaucrat performance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119871, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:119871
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    Cited by:

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    4. Haus, Martin, 2026. "Breaking out of low-effort traps: bureaucratic leadership by persuasion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 138865, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Haus, Martin, 2025. "Breaking Out of Low-Effort Traps: Bureaucratic Leadership by Persuasion," SocArXiv 9zx5w_v1, Center for Open Science.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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