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Do mentoring and oversight matter? The effects of allocating central administrators to local government units: evidence from Japan

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  • Nobuhiko Nakazawa

Abstract

During the 2000s, Japanese bureaucrats were actively transferred away from the central administration to mentor and monitor local governments. Using a dynamic difference-in-differences model under heterogeneous treatment effects that exploit the timing of these transfers and a rich city-level panel dataset, this study finds that municipalities with transferred central administrators improve their fiscal discipline, mainly by shrinking expenditures. The effects are persistent and continue for years after the arrival of the central administrator and even after the transfer ended (JEL H72, H74, K34).

Suggested Citation

  • Nobuhiko Nakazawa, 2024. "Do mentoring and oversight matter? The effects of allocating central administrators to local government units: evidence from Japan," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 338-361.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:40:y:2024:i:2:p:338-361.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Christofzik, Désirée I. & Märtz, Oliver, 2026. "Distance matters: Geographical proximity and fiscal rules enforcement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law

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