International Credit and Welfare: A Paradoxical Theorem and Its Policy Implications
This paper considers a developing nation that faces a foreign exchange shortage and hence its demand for foreign goods is limited both by its income and its foreign exchange balance. Availability of international credit relaxes the second constraint. We develop a simple model of strategic interaction between lending institutions and firms, and show that the availability of international credit at concessionary rates can leave the borrowing nation worse off than if it had to borrow money at higher market rates. This 'paradox of benevolence' is then used to motivate a discussion of policies pertaining to international lending and the Southern government's method of rationing out foreign exchange to the importers.
|Date of creation:||May 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (607) 255-9901
Fax: (607) 255-2818
Web page: http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/CAE/workingpapers.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995.
"Economic Reform and the Progress of Global Integration,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1733, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(1, 25th A), pages 1-118.
- Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989.
"The Scope for Collusive Behavior Among Debtor Countries,"
NBER Working Papers
2980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1990. "The scope for collusive behavior among debtor countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 297-313, April.
- Hansen, Henrik & Tarp, Finn, 2000.
"Aid and Growth Regressions,"
62288, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eaton, Jonathan, 1989. "Foreign public capital flows," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 25, pages 1305-1386 Elsevier.
- David H. Romer & Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1999. "Does Trade Cause Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 379-399, June.
- Heywood Fleisig & Catharine Hill, 1984. "The Benefits and Costs of Official Export Credit Programs," NBER Chapters, in: The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy, pages 321-358 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ben-David, Dan, 1993. "Equalizing Exchange: Trade Liberalization and Income Convergence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 653-79, August.
- Ashwini Deshpande, 1999. "Loan Pushing and Triadic Relations," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(4), pages 914-926, April.
- Burnside, Craig & Dollar, David, 1997.
"Aid, policies, and growth,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1777, The World Bank.
- Anant, T. C. A. & Basu, Kaushik & Mukherji, Badal, 1995. "A model of monopoly with strategic government intervention," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 25-43, May.
- Basu, K., 1991. "The International Debt Problem, Credit Rationing, and Loan Pushing: Theory and Experience," Princeton Studies in International Economics 70, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:corcae:05-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.