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A model of monopoly with strategic government intervention

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  • Anant, T. C. A.
  • Basu, Kaushik
  • Mukherji, Badal

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  • Anant, T. C. A. & Basu, Kaushik & Mukherji, Badal, 1995. "A model of monopoly with strategic government intervention," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 25-43, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:57:y:1995:i:1:p:25-43
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas McGuire & Michael Coiner & Larry Spancake, 1979. "Budget-maximizing agencies and efficiency in government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 333-357, September.
    2. A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn.
    3. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
    4. Basu, Kaushik & Singh, Nirvikar, 1990. "Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 61-71, February.
    5. von Furstenberg, George M & Green, R Jeffrey & Jeong, Jin-Ho, 1986. "Tax and Spend, or Spend and Tax?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(2), pages 179-188, May.
    6. Charles P. Kindleberger, 1984. "Multinational Excursions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262611996, December.
    7. Stern, Nicholas, 1987. "The effects of taxation, price control and government contracts in oligopoly and monopolistic competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 133-158, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arup Bose & Debashis Pal & David E. M. Sappington, 2016. "All entrepreneurial productivity increases are not created equal," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(3), pages 952-974, January.
    2. Heywood, John S. & Pal, Debashis, 1996. "How to tax a spatial monopolist," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 107-118, July.
    3. Mai, Nhat Chi, 2016. "The Influence Of Macroeconomic Announcements Into Vietnamese Stock Market Volatility," OSF Preprints ydmhx, Center for Open Science.
    4. Basu, Kaushik & Morita, Hodaka, 2006. "International credit and welfare: A paradoxical theorem and its policy implications," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1507-1528, August.
    5. Pal, Rupayan & Sharma, Ajay, 2013. "Endogenizing governments' objectives in tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 570-578.
    6. José Méndez‐Naya & José A. Novo‐Peteiro, 2023. "Partial privatization with endogenous choice of strategic variable," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(2), pages 1215-1227, March.
    7. Basu, Kaushik & Morita, Hodaka, 2001. "International Credit and Welfare: Some Paradoxical Results with Implications for the Organization of International Lending," Working Papers 01-05, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
    8. Debashis Pal & David Sappington & Ying Tang, 2012. "Sabotaging cost containment," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 293-314, June.

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