Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
This paper examines entry deterrence in a duopoly where the postentry game is Stackelberg. It is argued that, in reality, firms can use a broader range of precommitments than is allowed for in the literature. This paper permits such precommitments and analyzes the perfect equilibria. It also allows for the fact that there may be fixed costs associated not only with entry, but with beginning production. Several interesting possibilities are explained, including the existence of excess capacity and the holding of inventories even in the absence of any uncertainty. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 31 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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