Endogenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly And Private Duopoly -'Capacity-Then-Quantity' Game: The Linear Demand Case
We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/University of Adelaide and Flinders University.
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Volume (Year): 48 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
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