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Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?

  • Balogh, Tamás L.
  • Tasnádi, Attila

We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed price-setting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payoff equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves. Hence, it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30993.

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Date of creation: 19 May 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30993
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  1. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
  2. Juan Bárcena-Ruiz, 2007. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Price Competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 263-272, July.
  3. Corneo, Giacomo & Rob, Rafael, 2003. "Working in public and private firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1335-1352, August.
  4. Deneckere, Raymond J & Kovenock, Dan, 1992. "Price Leadership," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 143-62, January.
    • Raymond Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1988. "Price Leadership," Discussion Papers 773, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. CREMER, Helmuth & MARCHAND, Maurice & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market," CORE Discussion Papers RP 832, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Yuanzhu Lu & Sougata Poddar, 2009. "Endogenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly And Private Duopoly -'Capacity-Then-Quantity' Game: The Linear Demand Case ," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 138-150, 06.
  7. Yoshihiro Tomaru & Kazuharu Kiyono, 2010. "Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopoly with Increasing Marginal Costs," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(4), pages 591-613, December.
  8. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
  9. Hiroaki Ino & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2010. "What role should public enterprises play in free-entry markets?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 101(3), pages 213-230, November.
  10. Richard E. Levitan & Martin Shubik, 1970. "Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 287, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly," Working Papers 83-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  12. Anderson, S.P. & de Palma, A. & Thisse, J.F., 1995. "Privatization and Efficiency in a Differentiated Industry," Papers 9505, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  13. Jacques, Armel, 2004. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly: a forgotten equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 147-148, May.
  14. Hirata Daisuke, 2009. "Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly and Mergers," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, July.
  15. Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
  16. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-53, October.
  17. De Francesco, Massimo A. & Salvadori, Neri, 2008. "Bertrand-Edgeworth games under oligopoly with a complete characterization for the triopoly," MPRA Paper 8634, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2006:i:4:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Giacomo CORNEO & Oliver JEANNE, 1994. "Oligopole mixte dans un marché commun," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 33, pages 73-90.
  20. Tasnadi, Attila, 2004. "Production in advance versus production to order," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 191-204, June.
  21. Lu, Yuanzhu, 2007. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly: Another forgotten equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 226-227, February.
  22. Anam, Mahmudul & Basher, Syed A. & Chiang, Shin-Hwan, 2007. "Mixed Oligopoly under Demand Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 3451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2009. "Mixed Duopoly with Price Competition," MPRA Paper 9220, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  24. Kenneth Fjell & Debashis Pal, 1996. "A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 737-43, August.
  25. Steve Dowrick, 1986. "von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 251-260, Summer.
  26. Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Endogenous Role in Mixed Markets: A Two-Production-Period Model," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 70(2), pages 403-413, October.
  27. Tasnadi, Attila, 1999. "Existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 201-206, May.
  28. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1987. "Being a leader or a follower: Reflections on the distribution of roles in duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 175-192.
  29. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-11, April.
  30. Richard G. Harris & Elmer G. Wiens, 1980. "Government Enterprise: An Instrument for the Internal Regulation of Industry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(1), pages 125-32, February.
  31. Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, 1995. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Bertrand Equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 19-32, January.
  32. Akira Ogawa & Kazuhiko Kato, 2006. "Price Competition in a Mixed Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(4), pages 1-5.
  33. Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 181-185, November.
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