Endogenous Role in Mixed Markets: A Two-Production-Period Model
In this paper, I investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly, where private and state-owned public firms compete, by allowing two production periods. I find that many equilibria exist, including the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower. However, another Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the leader does not exist. If small inventory costs are introduced, the unique equilibrium outcome becomes the Stackelberg type where the public firm is the follower.
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Volume (Year): 70 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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