IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecb/ecbwps/20253079.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Central bank independence and risk-taking at the zero lower bound

Author

Listed:
  • Bartels, Bernhard
  • Eichengreen, Barry
  • Schumacher, Julian
  • Weder di Mauro, Beatrice

Abstract

Unprecedented balance sheet expansion in recent years has resulted in heightened financial risk for central banks, reflected initially in higher profits and subsequently in significant losses. Combining data on central bank balance sheets with market data on asset prices, we provide evidence on the evolution and determinants of financial risk-taking by 18 advanced economy central banks. Based on the estimated Value at Risk (VaR), we document that average central bank balance sheet risk increased to about 3 percent of GDP. Central banks took more risk in periods of low policy rates, less expansionary fiscal policies, and more favorable growth prospects. Less independent central banks were more risk averse than their more independent peers, contrary to the fiscal dominance view. JEL Classification: E52, E58, E63, G32

Suggested Citation

  • Bartels, Bernhard & Eichengreen, Barry & Schumacher, Julian & Weder di Mauro, Beatrice, 2025. "Central bank independence and risk-taking at the zero lower bound," Working Paper Series 3079, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20253079
    Note: 2604030
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp3079~9356571dab.en.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kevin D. Hoover & Stephen J. Perez, 1999. "Data mining reconsidered: encompassing and the general-to-specific approach to specification search," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 2(2), pages 167-191.
    2. Damian Clarke, 2014. "General-to-specific modeling in Stata," Stata Journal, StataCorp LLC, vol. 14(4), pages 895-908, December.
    3. Sergeyev, Dmitriy & Iovino, Luigi, 2018. "Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies Without Rational Expectations," CEPR Discussion Papers 13100, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Davide Romelli, 2022. "The political economy of reforms in Central Bank design: evidence from a new dataset," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 37(112), pages 641-688.
    5. Hillebrand, Martin & Böcker, Klaus, 2008. "Interaction of market and credit risk: an analysis of inter-risk correlation and risk aggregation," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 2008,11, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    6. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Hélène Rey, 2007. "International Financial Adjustment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(4), pages 665-703, August.
    7. Caballero, Diego & Lucas, André & Schwaab, Bernd & Zhang, Xin, 2020. "Risk endogeneity at the lender/investor-of-last-resort," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 283-297.
    8. Alexander Zimper, 2014. "The minimal confidence levels of Basel capital regulation," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 15(2), pages 129-143, April.
    9. Gebauer, Stefan & Pool, Sebastiaan & Schumacher, Julian, 2024. "The inflationary consequences of prioritising central bank profits," Working Paper Series 2985, European Central Bank.
    10. Emmanuel Farhi & Matteo Maggiori, 2018. "A Model of the International Monetary System," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(1), pages 295-355.
    11. Théodore Humann & Kris James Mitchener & Eric Monnet, 2025. "Do disinflation policies ravage central bank finances?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 40(122), pages 341-370.
    12. Cúrdia, Vasco & Woodford, Michael, 2011. "The central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of monetarypolicy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 54-79, January.
    13. Pierpaolo Benigno & Salvatore Nisticò, 2020. "Non-neutrality of Open-Market Operations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 175-226, July.
    14. Òscar Jordà & Björn Richter & Moritz Schularick & Alan M Taylor, 2021. "Bank Capital Redux: Solvency, Liquidity, and Crisis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(1), pages 260-286.
    15. Del Negro, Marco & Sims, Christopher A., 2015. "When does a central bank׳s balance sheet require fiscal support?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 1-19.
    16. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst & Matthias Paustian, 2017. "Targeting Long Rates in a Model with Segmented Markets," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 205-242, January.
    17. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    18. Wallace, Neil, 1981. "A Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Open-Market Operations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 267-274, June.
    19. Joachim Paulusch, 2017. "The Solvency II Standard Formula, Linear Geometry, and Diversification," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-12, May.
    20. A Durré & H Pill, 2012. "Central Bank balance sheets as policy tools," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Are central bank balance sheets in Asia too large?, volume 66, pages 193-213, Bank for International Settlements.
    21. Atsushi Tanaka, 2020. "Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey," Discussion Paper Series 208, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised May 2020.
    22. Andrew Filardo & James Yetman, 2012. "The expansion of central bank balance sheets in emerging Asia: what are the risks?," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, June.
    23. Karadi, Peter & Nakov, Anton, 2021. "Effectiveness and addictiveness of quantitative easing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 1096-1117.
    24. Jianping Li & Xiaoqian Zhu & Cheng-Few Lee & Dengsheng Wu & Jichuang Feng & Yong Shi, 2015. "On the aggregation of credit, market and operational risks," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 161-189, January.
    25. David Cook & James Yetman, 2012. "Expanding central bank balance sheets in emerging Asia: a compendium of risk and some evidence," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Are central bank balance sheets in Asia too large?, volume 66, pages 30-75, Bank for International Settlements.
    26. Matteo Bonetti & Dirk Broeders & Damiaan Chen & Daniel Dimitrov, 2024. "Central Bank Capital and Shareholder Relationship," Working Papers 809, DNB.
    27. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    28. Longin, Francois, 2005. "The choice of the distribution of asset returns: How extreme value theory can help?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 1017-1035, April.
    29. Ms. Filiz D Unsal & Mr. Chris Papageorgiou & Hendre Garbers, 2022. "Monetary Policy Frameworks: An Index and New Evidence," IMF Working Papers 2022/022, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    2. Richard Harrison, 2024. "Optimal quantitative easing and tightening," Bank of England working papers 1063, Bank of England.
    3. Reis, Ricardo, 2016. "Funding quantitative easing to target inflation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67883, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Tamim Bayoumi & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Karl F Habermeier & Tommaso Mancini Griffoli & Fabian Valencia, 2014. "Monetary Policy in the New Normal," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 14/3, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Reis, Ricardo, 2016. "Funding quantitative easing to target inflation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67883, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Dimakopoulou, Vasiliki & Economides, George & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2024. "Can central banks do the unpleasant job that governments should do?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    7. Federico Faveretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Financial Inequality, group entitlements and populism," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1892, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Arce, Óscar & Nuño, Galo & Thaler, Dominik & Thomas, Carlos, 2020. "A large central bank balance sheet? Floor vs corridor systems in a New Keynesian environment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 350-367.
    9. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    10. Joon Hyeok Lee, 2024. "Consecutive decentralization: The effect of central bank independence on capital account liberalization," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 809-831, July.
    11. Benczur, Peter & Konya, Istvan, 2013. "Convergence, capital accumulation and the nominal exchange rate," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 260-281.
    12. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    13. Giovanni B. Pittaluga & Elena Seghezza & Pierluigi Morelli, 2024. "The myth of federal reserve de facto independence," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 1675-1702, November.
    14. Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Sowerbutts, Rhiannon & Whitworth, Andrew, 2025. "Does regulatory and supervisory independence affect financial stability?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    15. Philipp Baumann & Enzo Rossi & Michael Schomaker, 2022. "Estimating the effect of central bank independence on inflation using longitudinal targeted maximum likelihood estimation," IFC Bulletins chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Machine learning in central banking, volume 57, Bank for International Settlements.
    16. repec:ecb:ecbdps:2024 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Pierpaolo Benigno & Salvatore Nisticò, 2020. "Non-neutrality of Open-Market Operations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 175-226, July.
    18. Galema, Rients & Lugo, Stefano, 2021. "When central banks buy corporate bonds: Target selection and impact of the European Corporate Sector Purchase Program," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    19. Julien Pinter, 2018. "Does Central Bank Financial Strength Really Matter for Inflation? The Key Role of the Fiscal Support," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 29(5), pages 911-952, November.
    20. Mr. Dominic Quint & Mr. Pau Rabanal, 2017. "Should Unconventional Monetary Policies Become Conventional?," IMF Working Papers 2017/085, International Monetary Fund.
    21. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "Beyond the Central Bank Independence Veil: New Evidence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1871, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20253079. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Official Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/emieude.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.