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Rate-of-return regulation to unlock natural gas pipeline deployment: insights from a Mozambican project

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  • Perrotton, F.
  • Massol, O.

Abstract

This paper examines the deployment of a natural gas pipeline in a developing region where the rate-of-return (RoR) regulation has been implemented to attract investment. We assume that the pipeline firm considers the proven demand emanating from a few large industrial sites but ignores the eventual rise of other domestic-oriented uses. We first assess the magnitude of the overcapitalization generated ex ante at the planning stage by the application of RoR regulation (i.e., the Averch-Johnson effect). We then analyze the ex-post situation when the enlarged domestic demand materializes. We prove that the allowable rate of return can be set to obtain ex ante the degree of overcapitalization needed ex post to serve the enlarged demand in a costefficient manner. We finally discuss whether RoR regulation can fulfill two public policy objectives: optimally building ahead of proven demand and protecting society from monopoly prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Perrotton, F. & Massol, O., 2018. "Rate-of-return regulation to unlock natural gas pipeline deployment: insights from a Mozambican project," Working Papers 18/05, Department of Economics, City University London.
    • Handle: RePEc:cty:dpaper:18/05
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    Cited by:

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    3. Nicolle, Adrien & Massol, Olivier, 2023. "Build more and regret less: Oversizing H2 and CCS pipeline systems under uncertainty," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    4. Singh, Kewal & Singh, Anoop & Prakash, Puneet, 2022. "Estimating the cost of equity for the regulated energy and infrastructure sectors in India," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).

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