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Disclosing vs. Withholding Technology Knowledge in a Duopoly

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  • Emanuele Bacchiega
  • Paolo Garella

    () (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, University of Bologna, Italy)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuele Bacchiega & Paolo Garella, 2006. "Disclosing vs. Withholding Technology Knowledge in a Duopoly," Working Papers 0609, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0609
    as

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    File URL: http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/wpa/docs/stt_3_mag.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hans Gersbach & Armin Schmutzler, 2003. "Endogenous spillovers and incentives to innovate," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(1), pages 59-79, January.
    2. d'Aspremont, Claude & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 389-404, November.
    3. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & GARELLA, Paolo G., 1995. ""Buy it or make it Yourself ?" A Paradox," CORE Discussion Papers 1995014, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E. M., 1992. "Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 43-69, February.
    5. Claude d'Aspremont & Sudipto Bhattacharya & Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, 2000. "Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 255-271.
    6. Milliou, Chrysovalantou, 2006. "Endogenous protection of R and D investments," UC3M Working papers. Economics we066325, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    7. De Fraja, Giovanni, 1993. "Strategic spillovers in patent races," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 139-146, March.
    8. Flaherty, M Therese, 1980. "Industry Structure and Cost-Reducing Investment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(5), pages 1187-1209, July.
    9. Perez-Castrillo, J. David & Sandonis, Joel, 1997. "Disclosure of know-how in research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 51-75, February.
    10. Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 1999. "A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 15(3), pages 253-262, November.
    11. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E M, 1990. "Sharing Productive Knowledge in Internally Financed R&D Contests," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 187-208, December.
    12. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Ulph, David, 1998. "Endogenous Spillovers and the Performance of Research Joint Ventures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 333-357, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Oligopoly; Information disclosure; R&D Joint Ventures; R&D Consortia; Returns to scale;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General

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