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Disclosing vs. withholding technology knowledge in a duopoly

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  • Paolo Giorgio GARELLA

    ()

  • Emanuele BACCHIEGA

    ()

Abstract

We study firms' incentives to transfer knowledge about production technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. In a setting where two technologies are available, a technology is characterized by its associated cost function and no single technology is strictly superior to the other. A firm has superior information if it knows both techniques and the other only one. Cost efficiency may be "reversed" after the voluntary disclosure, so that the rival's costs are improved at the equilibrium level of output. Adding R&D investments to the picture, we find that a firm can decide to invest just for the purpose of acquiring knowledge that will be transferred and not used. Furthermore, for the same point in the parameters space, the acquisition of full knowledge may occur or not as a function of the initial distribution of information

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File URL: http://wp.demm.unimi.it/tl_files/wp/2007/DEMM-2007_001wp.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2007-01.

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Date of creation: 14 Jan 2007
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Handle: RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2007-01
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Keywords: Oligopoly; Information disclosure; R&D Joint Ventures; R&D Consortia; Returns to scale;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General

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