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Sharing Productive Knowledge in Internally Financed R&D Contests

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  • Bhattacharya, Sudipto
  • Glazer, Jacob
  • Sappington, David E M

Abstract

We examine the optimal design of two-stage research and development (R&D) joint ventures. At the second stage, researchers choose R&D effort levels independently in an attempt to achieve an innovation. In the first stage, researchers have an opportunity to share endowments of productive knowledge. Initial pecuniary resources are limited, so rewards for disclosing knowledge and succeeding at the second stage must be financed from successful innovation. We derive conditions under which full sharing of knowledge and the socially desired levels of R&D effort can be motivated, and examine the optimal incentive structure when this ideal outcome cannot be implemented: full sharing will always be motivated at the first stage, but inefficient R&D effort wil be induced to foster information sharing. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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  • Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E M, 1990. "Sharing Productive Knowledge in Internally Financed R&D Contests," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 187-208, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:39:y:1990:i:2:p:187-208
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gamal Atallah, 2003. "Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(6), pages 531-554.
    2. repec:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:2:p:806-824 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Emanuele Bacchiega & Paolo Garella, 2006. "Disclosing vs. Withholding Technology Knowledge in a Duopoly," Working Papers 0609, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    4. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E. M., 1992. "Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 43-69, February.
    5. Emanuele Bacchiega & Paolo G. Garella, 2008. "Disclosing Versus Withholding Technology Knowledge In A Duopoly," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 76(1), pages 88-103, January.
    6. Andrzej Kwiatkowski, 2010. "Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 243, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    7. Aikaterini KOKKINOU, 2010. "Economic growth, innovation and collaborative research and development activities," Management & Marketing, Economic Publishing House, vol. 5(1), Spring.
    8. Jos Jansen, 2010. "STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 349-372, June.
    9. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Shyama Ramani, 2005. "Does trust matter for R&D cooperation? A game theoretic examination," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 143-180, March.

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