How Does Imperfect Competition in the Labour Market Affect Unemployment Policies?
We consider a continuum of workers ranked according to their ability to acquire education, and two firms with different technologies that compete imperfectly in wages to attract these workers. Once employed, each worker bears an education cost proportional to their initial ability, this cost being higher in the high-technology firm. At the Nash equilibrium, we show that unemployed workers are those with the lowest initial abilities. We then study different policies that subsidy either the education cost or wages and compare them. We found that the first best allocation can only be implemented by selective policies. We then analyse second best non-selective policies that do not discriminate between workers and firms and show that, in terms of welfare, subsidizing education costs or wages is strictly equivalent.
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- Jellal, Mohamed & Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Zenou, Yves, 2005.
"Demand uncertainty, mismatch and (un)employment,"
Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 33-39, July.
- JELLAL, Mohamed & THISSE, Jacques-François & ZENOU, Yves, 1997. "Demand uncertainty, mismatch, and (un)employment," CORE Discussion Papers 1997033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jellal, Mohamed & Thisse, Jacques-François & Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Demand uncertainty mismatch and (un)employment," MPRA Paper 38437, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- JELLAL, Mohamed & THISSE, Jacques-François & ZENOU, Yves, . "Demand uncertainty, mismatch and (un)employment," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1780, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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