The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals
In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive scheme on recommendation quality of investment products when advisors benefit from advising lower quality products. Experimental results reveal that, when group affiliation is strong, worse products are recommended significantly more often under team incentives than under individual incentives.
|Date of creation:||15 Oct 2012|
|Date of revision:||18 Dec 2012|
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