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Monetary Policy conduct in Review: The Appropriate Choice of Instruments


  • Runchana Pongsaparn

    (Bank of Thailand)

  • Panda Ketruangroch

    (Bank of Thailand)

  • Dhanaporn Hirunwong

    (Bank of Thailand)


TIn achieving price stability, a common mandate of monetary policy, central banks can choose different ways to conduct monetary policy. The difference in the conduct of monetary policy lies in the instrument they use not in the monetary policy regime per se. The paper finds that the higher the level of financial development, the higher degree of monopoly power (uniqueness) in exports and the stronger the institution, the more likely a country will use interest rate as the main monetary policy instrument. Furthermore, based on three criteria: (1) controllability of policy instrument and monetary conditions (2) the degree of counter-cyclicality and (3) the effectiveness of instrument in influencing inflation and output, interest rate appears to be an appropriate monetary policy instrument for Thailand. So far, performance of the current monetary policy framework in Thailand has been fine, with transparency through communication with the general public being one of the key factors contributing to the performance and policy effectiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Runchana Pongsaparn & Panda Ketruangroch & Dhanaporn Hirunwong, 2012. "Monetary Policy conduct in Review: The Appropriate Choice of Instruments," Working Papers 2012-05, Monetary Policy Group, Bank of Thailand.
  • Handle: RePEc:bth:wpaper:2012-05

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