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Efficiency and Foreclosure Effects of Vertical Rebates: Empirical Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher T. Conlon

    (New York University, Stern School)

  • Julie Holland Mortimer

    (Boston College)

Abstract

Vertical rebates are prominently used across a wide range of industries. These contracts may induce greater retail effort, but may also prompt retailers to drop competing products. We study these offsetting efficiency and foreclosure effects empirically, using data from one retailer. Using a field experiment, we show how the rebate allocates the cost of effort between manufacturer and retailer. We estimate models of consumer choice and retailer behavior to quantify the rebate’s effect on assortment and retailer effort. We find that the rebate increases industry profitability and consumer utility, but fails to maximize social surplus and leads to upstream foreclosure.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher T. Conlon & Julie Holland Mortimer, 2014. "Efficiency and Foreclosure Effects of Vertical Rebates: Empirical Evidence," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 863, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 01 Jun 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:863
    Note: previously circulated as "Efficiency and Foreclosure Effects of All-Units Discounts: Empirical Evidence"
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    Cited by:

    1. Steven Berry & Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, 2019. "Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial Organization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 44-68, Summer.
    2. Li, Jia & Moul, Charles C., 2015. "Who should handle retail? Vertical contracts, customer service, and social welfare in a Chinese mobile phone market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 29-43.
    3. Enrique Ide & Juan-Pablo Montero & Nicolás Figueroa, 2016. "Discounts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(7), pages 1849-1877, July.
    4. Amit Gandhi & Jean-François Houde, 2019. "Measuring Substitution Patterns in Differentiated-Products Industries," NBER Working Papers 26375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Arthur Lewbel, 2019. "The Identification Zoo: Meanings of Identification in Econometrics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(4), pages 835-903, December.
    6. Murry, Charles, 2018. "The effect of retail competition on relationship-specific investments: evidence from new car advertising," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 253-281.
    7. Yong Chao & Guofu Tan & Adam Chi Leung Wong, 2018. "All†units discounts as a partial foreclosure device," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(1), pages 155-180, March.
    8. Bogdan Genchev & Julie Holland Mortimer, 2016. "Empirical Evidence on Conditional Pricing Practices," NBER Working Papers 22313, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Chao, Yong & Tan, Guofu & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2019. "Asymmetry in capacity and the adoption of all-units discounts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 152-172.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    foreclosure; vertical restraints; conditional pricing practices; rebates;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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