Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintainance
We show that a manufacturer facing uncertain demand and selling through a competitive retail market may wish to support adequate retail inventories by preventing the emergence of discount retailers. In our model, discounters offer low prices made possible by low probability of being saddled with unsold inventories in the event of slack demand. Full-price retailers are compensated for a higher probability of unsold inventories by a higher retail price when they sell. We show that preventing discounting increases the manufacturer's wholesale demand and profits, and we delineate demand conditions under which equilibrium inventory holding and consumer welfare increase.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||Oct 1995|
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