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Incentives through the cycle: microfounded macroprudential regulation

  • Giovanni di Iasio

    ()

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Mario Quagliariello

    ()

    (European Banking Authority)

We provide a micro-based rationale for macroprudential capital regulation by developing a model in which bankers can privately undertake a costly effort and reduce the probability of adverse shocks to their asset holdings that force liquidation (deterioration risk). Low fundamental risk of assets guarantees benevolent funding conditions and banks are able to expand their balance sheets. The high continuation value would, in principle, improve incentives. However, the rise in asset demand and prices may jeopardize bankers' efforts whenever the liquidation price is high enough. This imposes socially inefficient liquidation which can be corrected with a capital requirement that aligns bankers' incentives. We show that a microprudential regulatory regime that disregards the equilibrium effect of asset prices on incentives performs poorly as low fundamental risk may induce high deterioration risk. Overall, the model suggests a theoretical foundation for the countercyclical capital buffer of Basel III, since it prescribes a macroprudential regulatory regime in which the equilibrium feedback effect is fully taken into account.

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Paper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area in its series Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) with number 894.

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Date of creation: Jan 2013
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Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_894_13
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