IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bdi/opques/qef_479_19.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Outline of a redistribution-free debt redemption fund for the euro area

Author

Listed:
  • Marika Cioffi

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Pietro Rizza

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Marzia Romanelli

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Pietro Tommasino

    (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

Public debts in the euro area have increased sharply due to the economic crisis, and remain at historically high levels in several countries. In a monetary union, high-debt members represent a permanent threat to financial stability, as they are subject � even if fundamentally solvent � to significant rollover risk. Given the tight financial and economic links between member states, a liquidity crisis in one of them would trigger area-wide turmoil. While prudent fiscal policies are essential to address the legacy debt problem, it takes time for them to bring the debt back to (at least) pre-crisis levels. Against this background, the paper explores the feasibility and desirability of transferring a share of national public debts to a European Redemption Fund. In exchange, each country would transfer a yearly flow of resources to the Fund. We show that it is possible to design such a scheme so that it does not entail any ex-ante cross-country redistribution, while the euro area as a whole would benefit as the lowering of member states� annual refinancing needs would improve financial stability. The fraction of mutualized debt would be fully redeemed over a reasonable number of years. The scheme would not jeopardize national commitment to debt reduction; if anything, market discipline would become more effective at the margin.

Suggested Citation

  • Marika Cioffi & Pietro Rizza & Marzia Romanelli & Pietro Tommasino, 2019. "Outline of a redistribution-free debt redemption fund for the euro area," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 479, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_479_19
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2019-0479/QEF_479_19.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Muellbauer, 2013. "Conditional eurobonds and the eurozone sovereign debt crisis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(3), pages 610-645, AUTUMN.
    2. Marco Committeri & Pietro Tommasino, 2018. "Managing sovereign debt restructurings in the euro zone. A note on old and current debates," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 451, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    3. Jochen Andritzky & Désirée I. Christofzik & Lars P. Feld & Uwe Scheuering, 2019. "A mechanism to regulate sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 20-34, May.
    4. Fabrizio Balassone & Sara Cecchetti & Martina Cecioni & Marika Cioffi & Wanda Cornacchia & Flavia Corneli & Gabriele Semeraro, 2018. "Economic governance in the euro area: balancing risk reduction and risk sharing," Chapters, in: Giuseppe Eusepi & Richard E. Wagner (ed.), Debt Default and Democracy, chapter 7, pages 124-154, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei, 2013. "Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone: An empirical test," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 15-36.
    6. Hasan Doluca & Malte Hübner & Dominik Rumpf & Benjamin Weigert, 2013. "The European Redemption Pact. An illustrative guide," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 341-367.
    7. Carmelo Pierpaolo Parello & Vincenzo Visco, 2012. "The European Redemption Fund: A Comparison of Two Proposals," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 273-306.
    8. Jean Tirole, 2015. "Country Solidarity in Sovereign Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2333-2363, August.
    9. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-661, September.
    10. Kaushik Basu & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2015. "Sovereign Debt and Joint Liability: An Economic Theory Model for Amending the Treaty of Lisbon," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 115-130, August.
    11. Beetsma, Roel & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2014. "An analysis of eurobonds," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 91-111.
    12. Raffaela Giordano & Marcello Pericoli & Pietro Tommasino, 2013. "Pure or Wake-up-Call Contagion? Another Look at the EMU Sovereign Debt Crisis," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 131-160, June.
    13. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    14. Clemens Fuest & Friedrich Heinemann & Christoph Schröder, 2016. "A Viable Insolvency Procedure for Sovereigns in the Euro Area," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 301-317, March.
    15. repec:pra:mprapa:42873 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Emanuele Baldacci & Sanjeev Gupta & Carlos Mulas-Granados, 2012. "Reassessing the fiscal mix for successful debt reduction [A historical public debt database]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 27(71), pages 365-406.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Flavia Corneli, 2024. "Sovereign debt maturity structure and its costs," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(1), pages 262-297, February.
    2. Mario Alloza & Javier Andrés & Pablo Burriel & Iván Kataryniuk & Javier J. Pérez & Juan Luis Vega, 2021. "La reforma del marco de gobernanza de la política fiscal de la Unión Europea en un nuevo entorno macroeconómico," Occasional Papers 2121, Banco de España.
    3. D'Andrea, Sara & Vassalli, Federica, 2022. "The Uncertainty of Fairness: a Game Theory Analysis for a Debt Mutualization Scheme in the Euro Area," MPRA Paper 114690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Lorenzo Esposito & Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2019. "Defaultnomics: Making Sense of the Barro-Ricardo Equivalence in a Financialized World," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_933, Levy Economics Institute.
    5. Alloza, Mario & Andrés, Javier & Pérez, Javier J. & Rojas, Juan A., 2020. "Implicit public debt thresholds: An operational proposal," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1408-1424.
    6. Giovanni Dosi & Marcello Minenna & Andrea Roventini & Roberto Violi, 2021. "Making the Eurozone work: a risk-sharing reform of the European Stability Mechanism," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 299(1), pages 617-657, April.
    7. Francesco Spadafora, 2020. "Completing the Economic and Monetary Union: Wisdom Come Late?," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 6(3), pages 379-409, November.
    8. Micossi, Stefano & Peirce, Fabrizia, 2020. "Overcoming the gridlock in EMU decision-making," CEPS Papers 26688, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    9. Mario Alloza & Javier Andrés & Pablo Burriel & Iván Kataryniuk & Javier J. Pérez & Juan Luis Vega, 2021. "The reform of the european Union’s fiscal governance Framework in a new Macroeconomic environment," Occasional Papers 2121, Banco de España.
    10. Francesco Spadafora, 2019. "European integration in the time of mistrust," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 512, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    11. Luciano Greco & Francesco Jacopo Pintus & Davide Raggi, 2023. "When Fiscal Discipline meets Macroeconomic Stability: the Euro-stability Bond," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0300, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Giovanni Dosi & Marcello Minenna & Andrea Roventini & Roberto Violi, 2021. "Making the Eurozone work: a risk-sharing reform of the European Stability Mechanism," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 299(1), pages 617-657, April.
    2. Marco Committeri & Pietro Tommasino, 2018. "Managing sovereign debt restructurings in the euro zone. A note on old and current debates," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 451, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    3. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Erce, Aitor & Uy, Timothy, 2017. "Official Sector Lending Strategies during the Euro Area Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 12228, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Wei Cui, 2017. "Macroeconomic Effects of Delayed Capital Liquidation," Discussion Papers 1719, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    5. Bahaj, Saleem A., 2014. "Systemic sovereign risk: macroeconomic implications in the euro area," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58110, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Badarau, Cristina & Huart, Florence & Sangaré, Ibrahima, 2021. "Macroeconomic and policy implications of eurobonds," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    7. Cornand, Camille & Gandré, Pauline & Gimet, Céline, 2016. "Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: The role of domestic shocks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 445-469.
    8. Joao Ayres & Gaston Navarro & Juan Pablo Nicolini & Pedro Teles, 2019. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises with Long Stagnations," Working Papers 757, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    9. Bacchetta, Philippe & Perazzi, Elena & van Wincoop, Eric, 2018. "Self-fulfilling debt crises: What can monetary policy do?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 119-134.
    10. Giuliana Passamani & Roberto Tamborini & Matteo Tomaselli, 2014. "Sustainability vs. credibility of fiscal consolidation. A Principal Components test for the Euro Zone," DEM Discussion Papers 2014/09, Department of Economics and Management.
    11. Blot, Christophe & Ducoudré, Bruno & Timbeau, Xavier, 2016. "Sovereign debt spread and default in a model with self-fulfilling prophecies and asymmetric information," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB), pages 281-299.
    12. Michal Szkup, 2022. "Preventing Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: A Global Games Approach," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 43, pages 22-55, January.
    13. Cohen, Daniel & Villemot, Sébastien, 2015. "Endogenous debt crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 337-369.
    14. Theodoros V. Stamatopoulos & Stavros E. Arvanitis & Dimitris M. Terzakis, 2017. "The risk of the sovereign debt default: the Eurozone crisis 2008–2013," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(38), pages 3782-3796, August.
    15. Niels Gilbert, 2019. "Euro area sovereign risk spillovers before and after the ECB's OMT announcement," DNB Working Papers 636, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    16. Cheng, Jin & Dai, Meixing & Dufourt, Frédéric, 2017. "Banking and sovereign debt crises in a monetary union without central bank intervention," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 142-151.
    17. Große Steffen, Christoph, 2015. "Uncertainty shocks and non-fundamental debt crises: An ambiguity approach," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112936, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5bhbhfsmhj981b00go8c6saind is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Philippe Bacchetta & Elena Perazzi & Eric van Wincoop, 2015. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: Can Monetary Policy Really Help?," NBER Working Papers 21158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Zaghini, Andrea, 2019. "The CSPP at work: Yield heterogeneity and the portfolio rebalancing channel," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 282-297.
    21. Ayres, João & Navarro, Gaston & Nicolini, Juan Pablo & Teles, Pedro, 2018. "Sovereign default: The role of expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 803-812.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Euro area; sovereign debt; debt redemption fund; financial stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_479_19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bdigvit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.