IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Dual employment protection legislation: a framework for analysis

  • Juan J. Dolado


    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

  • Marcel Jansen


    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

  • Juan F. Jimeno


    (Banco de España)

In many countries, Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) establishes different regulations for certain groups of workers who face more disadvantages in the labor market (young workers, women, unskilled workers, etc.) with the aim of improving their employability. Well known examples are the introduction of atypical employment contracts (e.g., temporary and determined duration contracts) which ease firing restrictions for some, but not all, workers. This paper discusses the effects of EPL varying among workers of different skills on the level and composition of unemployment, job flows, productivity and welfare. By using an extension of Mortensen Pissarides' (1994) search model where heterogeneous workers compete for the same jobs, we are able to identify several key channels through which changing firing costs for some groups of workers affects hiring and firing of all workers and, hence, may have a different impact on aggregate labor market variables than reducing firing costs across the board. Some analytical and simulation results also show that these effects of differentiated firing costs by workers' skills may be different depending upon the initial state of the labor market.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: First version, May 2005
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Banco de Espa�a in its series Banco de Espa�a Working Papers with number 0510.

in new window

Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bde:wpaper:0510
Contact details of provider: Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. James Albrecht & Susan Vroman, 2000. "A Matching Model with Endogenous Skill Requirements," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0774, Econometric Society.
  2. Dolado, Juan J. & Jansen, Marcel & Jimeno, Juan F., 2005. "Dual Employment Protection Legislation: A Framework for Analysis," IZA Discussion Papers 1564, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Olivier Blanchard & Augustin Landier, 2001. "The Perverse Effects of Partial Labor Market Reform: Fixed Duration Contracts in France," NBER Working Papers 8219, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher, 1999. "New Developments in Models of Search in the Labour Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 2053, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Boeri, Tito & Jimeno, Juan F, 2003. "The Effects of Employment Protection: Learning from Variable Enforcement," CEPR Discussion Papers 3926, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Dolado, Juan J. & Garcia-Serrano, Carlos & Jimeno, Juan F, 2001. "Drawing Lessons From the Boom of Temporary Jobs in Spain," CEPR Discussion Papers 2884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Wouter J. den Haan & Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1997. "Job Destruction and Propagation of Shocks," NBER Working Papers 6275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Fabio Canova & Matteo Ciccarelli & Eva Ortega, 2003. "Similarities and convergence in G-7 cycles," Economics Working Papers 924, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Aug 2004.
  9. Olivier Blanchard & Justin Wolfers, 1999. "The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Kugler, Adriana & Jimeno, Juan F. & Hernanz, Virginia, 2002. "Employment Consequences of Restrictive Permanent Contracts: Evidence from Spanish Labor Market Reforms," IZA Discussion Papers 657, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  11. Giuseppe Bertola & Francine Blau & Lawrence Kahn, 2007. "Labor market institutions and demographic employment patterns," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 833-867, October.
  12. Cahuc, Pierre & Postel-Vinay, Fabien, 2002. "Temporary jobs, employment protection and labor market performance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, February.
  13. repec:fda:fdaddt:2003-21 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Belot, M.V.K. & Boone, J. & van Ours, J.C., 2002. "Welfare Effects of Employment Protection," Discussion Paper 2002-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  15. Dreze, Jacques H. & Malinvaud, Edmond, 1994. "Growth and employment: The scope of a European initiative," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 489-504, April.
  16. Camacho, Maximo & Pérez-Quirós, Gabriel, 2005. "Jump-and-Rest Effects of US Business Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 4975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Javier Andres & J. David López-Salido & Edward Nelson, 2004. "Tobin's imperfect asset substitution in optimizing general equilibrium," Working Papers 2004-003, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  18. Robert-Paul Berben & Alberto Locarno & Julian Morgan & Javier Vallés, 2005. "Cross-country differences in monetary policy transmission," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0502, Banco de Espa�a.
  19. Alison L Booth & Juan J. Dolado & Jeff Frank, 2002. "Symposium On Temporary Work Introduction," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages F181-F188, June.
  20. Acemoglu, D, 1996. "Good Jobs Versus Bad Jobs : Theory and Some Evidence," Working papers 96-33, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  21. Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2001. "Labor Market Policies and Employment Duration: The Effects of Labor Market Reform in Argentina," Research Department Publications 3106, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  22. Burda, Michael C, 1992. " A Note on Firing Costs and Severance Benefits in Equilibrium Unemployment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(3), pages 479-89.
  23. Ana Buisán & Juan Carlos Caballero & José Manuel Campa & Noelia Jiménez, 2004. "La importancia de la histéresis en las exportaciones de manufacturas de los países de la UEM," Monetaria, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(2), pages 169-222, abril-jun.
  24. Lars Ljungqvist, 2002. "How Do Lay--off Costs Affect Employment?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(482), pages 829-853, October.
  25. David Neumark & William Wascher, 2004. "Minimum wages, labor market institutions, and youth employment: A cross-national analysis," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 57(2), pages 223-248, January.
  26. Dale T. Mortensen & Christopher A. Pissarides, 1994. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 397-415.
  27. Juan F. Jimeno & Diego Rodríguez-Palenzuela, 2003. "Youth Unemployment in the OECD: Demographic Shifts, Labour Market Institutions and Macroeconomic Shocks," Economics Working Papers 019, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bde:wpaper:0510. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mar�a Beiro. Electronic Dissemination of Information Unit. Research Department. Banco de Espa�a)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.