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Sergey Stepanov

Personal Details

First Name:Sergey
Middle Name:
Last Name:Stepanov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pst202
https://sites.google.com/site/sergeystepan/
Terminal Degree:2005 European Centre for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; Université Libre de Bruxelles (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(50%) International College of Economics and Finance (ICEF)
National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE)

Moscow, Russia
http://icef.hse.ru/
RePEc:edi:ichseru (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Faculty of Economics
National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE)

Moscow, Russia
http://economics.hse.ru/
RePEc:edi:fehseru (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. Sergey Stepanov, 2012. "Takeovers under Asymmetric Information: Block Trades and Tender Offers in Equilibrium," Working Papers w0185, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  2. Ruben Enikolopov & Maria Petrova & Sergey Stepanov, 2012. "Firm Value in Crisis: Effects of Firm-Level Transparency and Country-Level Institutions," Working Papers w0184, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  3. Sergey Stepanov, 2009. "Shareholder Protection and Outside Blockholders: Substitutes or Complements?," Working Papers w0133, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  4. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2008. "Corporate Governance, Ownership Structures and Investment in Transition Economies: the Case of Russia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan," Working Papers w0119, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  5. Sergey Stepanov, 2007. "Shareholder Access to Manager-Biased Courts and the Monitoring/Litigation Tradeoff," Working Papers w0106, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
  6. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2007. "A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia," Working Papers w0103, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

Articles

  1. Stepanov, Sergey, 2020. "Biased performance evaluation in a model of career concerns: incentives versus ex-post optimality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 589-607.
  2. Sergey Stepanov, 2019. "Transfers of corporate control in firms with noncontrolling blockholders," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(2), pages 453-480, June.
  3. Stepanov, Sergey & Suvorov, Anton, 2017. "Agency problem and ownership structure: Outside blockholder as a signal," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 87-107.
  4. Enikolopov, Ruben & Petrova, Maria & Stepanov, Sergey, 2014. "Firm value in crisis: Effects of firm-level transparency and country-level institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 72-84.
  5. Sergey Stepanov, 2013. "Shareholder Protection and Outside Blockholders: Substitutes or Complements?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 355-381, June.
  6. Sergey Stepanov, 2010. "Shareholder access to manager‐biased courts and the monitoring/litigation trade‐off," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 270-300, June.

Chapters

  1. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2008. "A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia," Springer Books, in: Robert W. McGee (ed.), Corporate Governance in Transition Economies, chapter 32, pages 315-349, Springer.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Sergey Stepanov, 2012. "Takeovers under Asymmetric Information: Block Trades and Tender Offers in Equilibrium," Working Papers w0185, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

    Cited by:

    1. Chi Man Leung & Yue Kuen Kwok, 2018. "Real options signaling game models for dynamic acquisition under information asymmetry," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 41(1), pages 35-63, May.

  2. Ruben Enikolopov & Maria Petrova & Sergey Stepanov, 2012. "Firm Value in Crisis: Effects of Firm-Level Transparency and Country-Level Institutions," Working Papers w0184, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

    Cited by:

    1. Sprenger, Carsten & Lazareva, Olga, 2022. "Corporate governance and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Evidence from Russian unlisted firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 71-100.
    2. Anton, Sorin Gabriel & Nucu, Anca Elena Afloarei, 2022. "On the role of institutional factors in shaping working capital management policies: Empirical evidence from European listed firms," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(2).
    3. Neupane, Biwesh & Thapa, Chandra & Marshall, Andrew & Neupane, Suman & Shrestha, Chaman, 2024. "Do foreign institutional investors improve board monitoring?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    4. Luigi Aldieri & Cristian Barra & Nazzareno Ruggiero & Concetto Paolo Vinci, 2023. "Corruption and firms’ efficiency: international evidence using an instrumental variable approach," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 40(2), pages 731-759, July.
    5. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Signori, Andrea & Vismara, Silvio, 2023. "The exit choices of European private firms: A dynamic empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    6. Michael Machokoto & Geofry Areneke & Davis Nyangara, 2021. "Financial conservatism, firm value and international business risk: Evidence from emerging economies around the global financial crisis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 4590-4608, July.
    7. Hartwell, Christopher A. & Malinowska, Anna P., 2019. "Informal institutions and firm valuation," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-1.
    8. Imen Ghadhab, 2021. "Cross-listing and crisis," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 22(7), pages 539-558, December.
    9. Grosman, Anna & Leiponen, Aija, 2018. "Organizational transparency and power in firm ownership networks," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1158-1177.
    10. Sikarwar, Ekta, 2022. "Board attributes, hedging activities and exchange rate risk: Multi-country firm-level evidence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    11. Kim, Huong Trang & Papanastassiou, Marina & Nguyen, Quang, 2017. "Multinationals and the impact of corruption on financial derivatives use and firm value: Evidence from East Asia," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 39-59.
    12. Hsu, Yu-Lin & Tang, Leilei, 2022. "Effects of investor sentiment and country governance on unexpected conditional volatility during the COVID-19 pandemic: Evidence from global stock markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    13. Ho, Kung-Cheng & Yen, Huang-Ping & Gu, Yan & Shi, Lisi, 2020. "Does societal trust make firms more trustworthy?," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(C).

  3. Sergey Stepanov, 2009. "Shareholder Protection and Outside Blockholders: Substitutes or Complements?," Working Papers w0133, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

    Cited by:

    1. Chiang, Yao-Min & Chang, Pang-Ru, 2022. "Overinvestment, ownership structure, and directors' and officers’ liability insurance," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 38-50.
    2. Adongo, Jonathan O., 2017. "Legal jurisdiction, director liability law, and venture capitalists’ equity stakes in Africa," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 78-93.
    3. Stepanov, Sergey & Suvorov, Anton, 2017. "Agency problem and ownership structure: Outside blockholder as a signal," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 87-107.
    4. Sergey Stepanov, 2007. "Shareholder Access to Manager-Biased Courts and the Monitoring/Litigation Tradeoff," Working Papers w0106, New Economic School (NES).

  4. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2008. "Corporate Governance, Ownership Structures and Investment in Transition Economies: the Case of Russia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan," Working Papers w0119, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

    Cited by:

    1. Sprenger, Carsten & Lazareva, Olga, 2022. "Corporate governance and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Evidence from Russian unlisted firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 71-100.
    2. Carsten Sprenger & Olga Lazareva, 2017. "Corporate Governance and Investment: Evidence from Russian Unlisted Firms," HSE Working papers WP BRP 160/EC/2017, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    3. Ahmed Abousamak, 2016. "Principal-principal internal governance mechanisms and the firms' performance: evidence from an emerging market," International Journal of Economics and Business Research, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 11(2), pages 145-169.

  5. Sergey Stepanov, 2007. "Shareholder Access to Manager-Biased Courts and the Monitoring/Litigation Tradeoff," Working Papers w0106, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

    Cited by:

    1. Stepanov, Sergey & Suvorov, Anton, 2017. "Agency problem and ownership structure: Outside blockholder as a signal," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 87-107.
    2. Grechenig, Kristoffel & Sekyra, Michael, 2011. "No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 16-20, March.

  6. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2007. "A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia," Working Papers w0103, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).

    Cited by:

    1. Kapeliushnikov, Rostislav & Kuznetsov, Andrei & Demina, Natalia & Kuznetsova, Olga, 2013. "Threats to security of property rights in a transition economy: An empirical perspective," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 245-264.
    2. Vanteeva, Nadia, 2016. "In the absence of private property rights: Political control and state corporatism during Putin's first tenure," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 41-55.
    3. Fiedorczuk Monika, 2017. "The Specificity of Boards of Directors in Russian Companies," Journal of Management and Business Administration. Central Europe, Sciendo, vol. 25(4), pages 96-118, December.
    4. Igor Goncharov & Sander Triest, 2014. "Unintended Consequences of Changing Accounting Standards: The Case of Fair Value Accounting and Mandatory Dividends," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 50(3), pages 341-367, September.
    5. Sprenger, Carsten & Lazareva, Olga, 2022. "Corporate governance and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Evidence from Russian unlisted firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 71-100.
    6. Kuznecovs, Mihails & Pal, Sarmistha, 2012. "Does Corporate Governance Reform Necessarily Boost Firm Performance? Recent Evidence from Russia," IZA Discussion Papers 6519, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2008. "The determinants of board composition in a transforming economy: Evidence from Russia," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 532-549, December.
    8. Sergey Solntsev, 2013. "Senior management labor market: from economic growth to crisis. The case of Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 10/MAN/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    9. Carsten Sprenger & Olga Lazareva, 2017. "Corporate Governance and Investment: Evidence from Russian Unlisted Firms," HSE Working papers WP BRP 160/EC/2017, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    10. Banerjee, Suman & Masulis, Ronald & Pal, Sarmistha, 2016. "Regulation and Firm Value: Curious Case of Transparency and Disclosure Laws in Russia," IZA Discussion Papers 9890, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. World Bank, 2011. "Russia : Reshaping Economic Geography," World Bank Publications - Reports 13052, The World Bank Group.
    12. Muravyev, Alexander & Berezinets, Irina & Ilina, Yulia, 2014. "The structure of corporate boards and private benefits of control: Evidence from the Russian stock exchange," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 247-261.
    13. Bykova, Anna & Molodchik, Mariia & Shamilova, Ekaterina, 2017. "Ownership concentration, corporate governance development and firm performance in Russian listed companies," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 45, pages 50-74.
    14. Iwasaki, Ichiro & Mizobata, Satoshi, 2018. "Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in European Emerging Economies: A Meta-Analysis," CEI Working Paper Series 2018-8, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    15. Dolgopyatova, Tatiana & Libman, Alexander & Yakovlev, Andrei, 2018. "Unintended Benefits of Empowering Boards in Conglomerates: A Case Study of AFK Sistema," Journal of East European Management Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 23(2), pages 177-202.
    16. Grosman, Anna & Leiponen, Aija, 2018. "Organizational transparency and power in firm ownership networks," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1158-1177.
    17. Li, Wei-Xuan & Chen, Clara Chia-Sheng & French, Joseph J., 2012. "The relationship between liquidity, corporate governance, and firm valuation: Evidence from Russia," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 465-477.
    18. Farrukh Suvankulov & Fatma Ogucu, 2012. "Have firms with better corporate governance fared better during the recent financial crisis in Russia?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(8), pages 769-773, May.
    19. Alexeev, Michael & Weber, Shlomo (ed.), 2013. "The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199759927.
    20. Zavertiaeva, Marina & Nechaeva, Iuliia, 2017. "Impact of Market Timing on the Capital Structure of Russian Companies," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 10-28.
    21. Alexander Libman & Tatiana G. Dolgopyatova & Andrey A. Yakovlev, 2014. "The Birth Of An Entrepreneurial Board In Emerging Markets: A Russian Case," HSE Working papers WP BRP 29/MAN/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

Articles

  1. Sergey Stepanov, 2019. "Transfers of corporate control in firms with noncontrolling blockholders," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(2), pages 453-480, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Ruiming & Si, Haiping & Miao, Miao, 2022. "One false step can make a great difference: Does corporate litigation cause the exit of the controlling shareholder?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).

  2. Enikolopov, Ruben & Petrova, Maria & Stepanov, Sergey, 2014. "Firm value in crisis: Effects of firm-level transparency and country-level institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 72-84.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Sergey Stepanov, 2013. "Shareholder Protection and Outside Blockholders: Substitutes or Complements?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 355-381, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Sergey Stepanov, 2010. "Shareholder access to manager‐biased courts and the monitoring/litigation trade‐off," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 270-300, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.

Chapters

  1. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2008. "A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia," Springer Books, in: Robert W. McGee (ed.), Corporate Governance in Transition Economies, chapter 32, pages 315-349, Springer.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of chapters recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

Featured entries

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki entries:
  1. New Economic School Alumni
  2. Top Russian Federation Economists

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (3) 2007-07-07 2007-08-27 2008-10-13
  2. NEP-TRA: Transition Economics (2) 2007-07-07 2008-10-13
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2009-12-05
  4. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2007-08-27

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