IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pla507.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Henrik Dan Lando

Personal Details

First Name:Henrik
Middle Name:Dan
Last Name:Lando
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pla507
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Copenhagen Business School

København, Denmark
http://www.cbs.dk/
RePEc:edi:cbschdk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Lando, Henrik & Rose, Caspar, 2001. "On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs," Working Papers 2000-10, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
  2. Lando, Henrik, 2000. "The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter," Working Papers 2000-7, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
  3. Lando, Henrik, 2000. "Ny lov om jordforurening i økonomisk belysning," Working Papers 2000-11, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
  4. Henrik Lando, 1994. "Allocating Durable Goods Through a First-Come Rule or Through Individual Ownership," Discussion Papers 94-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  5. Henrik Lando, 1993. "The Dual-Class Share System and the Allocation of Control over Time," Discussion Papers 93-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  6. Henrik Lando & Michael Teit Nielsen, 1990. "Why Political Uncertainty May Paralyze the Housing Market," Discussion Papers 90-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  7. henrik lando, "undated". "The Myth Of Specific Performance in Civil Law Countries," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1014, American Law & Economics Association.
  8. : Henrik Lando, "undated". "Some Determinants of Insider Power in the Labor Market," Discussion Papers 93-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  9. Henrik Lando, "undated". "The Dual Class Share System and the Market for Corporate Control," Discussion Papers 94-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Henrik Lando, 2010. "Optimal Standards of Negligence When One Party Is Uninformed of the Standards," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 592-608.
  2. Lando Henrik, 2009. "Prevention of Crime and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 33-52, January.
  3. Henrik Lando, 2006. "Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 327-337, June.
  4. Lando Henrik, 2006. "A Derivation of Probabilities of Correct and Wrongful Conviction in a Criminal Trial," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 371-379, October.
  5. Lando Henrik, 2005. "The Size of the Sanction Should Depend on the Weight of the Evidence," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 277-292, September.
  6. Lando, Henrik & Rose, Caspar, 2004. "On the enforcement of specific performance in Civil Law countries," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 473-487, December.
  7. Lando, Henrik & Shavell, Steven, 2004. "The advantage of focusing law enforcement effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 209-218, June.
  8. Jebjerg Lars & Lando Henrik, 2002. "A Reply to Cathrine Hagem's: The Kyoto Protocol, Tradeable Quotas and Firm Survival," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(3), pages 469-471, July.
  9. Henrik Lando, 2002. "The Ninth Joint Conference on Risk and Insurance of the Geneva Association and the European Association of Law and Economics," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 27(4), pages 580-581, October.
  10. Henrik Lando, 2002. "When is the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Optimal?," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 27(4), pages 602-608, October.
  11. Lando, Henrik & Nielsen, Michael Teit, 1998. "Flexibility and uncertainty in the housing market1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 419-431, December.
  12. Lars Jebjerg & Henrik Lando, 1997. "Regulating a Polluting Firm Under Asymmetric Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(3), pages 267-284, October.
  13. Lando, Henrik, 1997. "An attempt to incorporate fairness into an economic model of tort law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 575-587, December.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Lando, Henrik, 2000. "The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter," Working Papers 2000-7, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.

    Cited by:

    1. Lehmann, Markus A., 2002. "Error minimization and deterrence in agency control," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 373-391, May.
    2. Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gomez & Jose Penalva, 2015. "Minimizing errors, maximizing incentives: Optimal court decisions and the quality of evidence," Economics Working Papers 1500, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Derek Pyne, 2004. "Can Making It Harder to Convict Criminals Ever Reduce Crime?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 191-201, September.

Articles

  1. Lando Henrik, 2009. "Prevention of Crime and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 33-52, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Obidzinski, Marie & Oytana, Yves, 2019. "Identity errors and the standard of proof," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 73-80.
    2. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytanay, 2018. "Identity mistakes and the standard of proof," TEPP Working Paper 2018-08, TEPP.
    3. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2013. "In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral explanations of pro-defendant bias in procedures," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS04, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.
    4. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence," Post-Print hal-04035073, HAL.
    5. Murat C. Mungan & Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error," Working Papers 2020-09, CRESE.
    6. Ronen Bar-El & Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2021. "A Talmudic constrained voting majority rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 465-491, December.
    7. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2013. "Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 395-411, June.
    8. Kristoffel Grechenig & Andreas Nicklisch & Christian Thöni, 2010. "Punishment despite Reasonable Doubt – A Public Goods Experiment with Uncertainty over Contributions," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    9. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2009. "Better that X guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer," Working Papers 168, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2009.
    10. Kristoffel Grechenig & Andreas Nicklisch & Christian Thöni, 2010. "Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt—A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(4), pages 847-867, December.
    11. Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2024. "Decisiveness, Correctness and Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication," Working papers 350, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    12. Mungan Murat C., 2013. "Optimal Warning Strategies: Punishment Ought Not to Be Inflicted Where the Penal Provision Is Not Properly Conveyed," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 303-339, November.
    13. Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "Empirical Analysis of Sanctions for Environmental Offenses," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 161-194, December.

  2. Henrik Lando, 2006. "Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 327-337, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Rizzolli, Matteo & Tremewan, James, 2018. "Hard labor in the lab: Deterrence, non-monetary sanctions, and severe procedures," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 107-121.
    2. Obidzinski, Marie & Oytana, Yves, 2019. "Identity errors and the standard of proof," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 73-80.
    3. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytanay, 2018. "Identity mistakes and the standard of proof," TEPP Working Paper 2018-08, TEPP.
    4. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2013. "In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral explanations of pro-defendant bias in procedures," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS04, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.
    5. Lando Henrik, 2009. "Prevention of Crime and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 33-52, January.
    6. Šastitko, Andrej E., 2013. "Effects of third party errors," EconStor Preprints 121747, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    7. Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2012. "Antitrust in Innovative Industries: the Optimal Legal Standards," Working Papers 434, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    8. Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2012. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 311-338.
    9. Bertrand Chopard & Edwige Marion & Ludivine Roussey, 2014. "Does the Appeals Process Lower the Occurrence of Legal Errors?," Working Papers hal-04141314, HAL.
    10. De Geest, Gerrit & Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Siegers, Jacques J., 2009. "Annullable bonuses and penalties," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 349-359, December.
    11. Mungan, Murat C., 2014. "A behavioral justification for escalating punishment schemes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 189-197.
    12. Motta, Alberto & Burlando, Alfredo, 2007. "Self reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," MPRA Paper 5332, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Jun 2007.
    13. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2013. "Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 395-411, June.
    14. Feess, Eberhard & Schramm, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2014. "The Impact of Fine Size and Uncertainty on Punishment and Deterrence: Evidence from the Laboratory," MPRA Paper 59463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Alexander Lundberg, 2024. "Do prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(2), pages 650-674, April.
    16. Cremers, Katrin & Gaessler, Fabian & Harhoff, Dietmar & Helmers, Christian & Lefouili, Yassine, 2016. "Invalid but infringed? An analysis of the bifurcated patent litigation system," TSE Working Papers 16-698, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    17. Feess, Eberhard & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Schramm, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2015. "The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence: Theory and evidence from the laboratory," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 526, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    18. Doménech, Gabriel & Puchades, Miguel, 2015. "Compensating acquitted pre-trial detainees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 167-177.
    19. Lang, Matthias, 2017. "Legal uncertainty as a welfare enhancing screen," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 274-289.
    20. Kristoffel Grechenig & Andreas Nicklisch & Christian Thöni, 2010. "Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt—A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(4), pages 847-867, December.
    21. Immordino, Giovanni & Polo, Michele, 2014. "Antitrust, legal standards and investment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 36-50.
    22. Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2018. "Law Enforcement And Wrongful Arrests With Endogenously (In)Competent Officers," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1417-1436, April.
    23. Thomas J. Miceli & Murat C. Mungan, 2021. "The limit of law: factors influencing the decision to make harmful acts illegal," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 293-307, September.
    24. Pavlova, Natalia & Shastitko, Andrey, 2016. "Leniency programs and socially beneficial cooperation: Effects of type I errors," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 375-401.
    25. Lando, Henrik & Mungan, Murat C., 2018. "The effect of type-1 error on deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 1-8.
    26. Ikeda Yasuhiro & Mori Daisuke, 2015. "Can Decoupling Punitive Damages Deter an Injurer’s Harmful Activity?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 513-528, November.
    27. Shastitko, Andrey, 2014. "Effects of the Third Party Errors," Published Papers re9021, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    28. Roee Sarel, 2022. "Crime and punishment in times of pandemics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 155-186, October.
    29. Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, 2016. "Reducing False Guilty Pleas and Wrongful Convictions through Exoneree Compensation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 173-189.
    30. DeAngelo Gregory & McCannon Bryan C., 2016. "Public Outcry and Police Behavior," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 619-645, April.
    31. Mungan, Murat C., 2015. "Wrongful convictions and the punishment of attempts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 79-87.
    32. Mungan Murat C., 2013. "Optimal Warning Strategies: Punishment Ought Not to Be Inflicted Where the Penal Provision Is Not Properly Conveyed," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 303-339, November.
    33. Stan Miles & Derek Pyne, 2015. "Deterring repeat offenders with escalating penalty schedules: a Bayesian approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 229-250, August.
    34. Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2011. "Optimal Legal Standards in Antitrust: Traditional v. Innovative Industries," Working Papers 420, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

  3. Lando Henrik, 2005. "The Size of the Sanction Should Depend on the Weight of the Evidence," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 277-292, September.

    Cited by:

    1. McCannon, Bryan C., 2010. "The median juror and the trial of Socrates," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 533-540, December.

  4. Lando, Henrik & Rose, Caspar, 2004. "On the enforcement of specific performance in Civil Law countries," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 473-487, December.

    Cited by:

    1. M’hand Fares, 2011. "Can a specific performance contract solve the hold-up problem? [Un contrat à obligation d’exécution peut-il résoudre le problème du hold-up ?]," Post-Print hal-02647357, HAL.

  5. Lando, Henrik & Shavell, Steven, 2004. "The advantage of focusing law enforcement effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 209-218, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2013. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 51369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Zhixin Dai & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2016. "The Efficiency of Crackdowns: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Public Transportations," Working Papers halshs-01270808, HAL.
    3. Bård Harstad & Torben Mideksa, 2015. "Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes," CESifo Working Paper Series 5334, CESifo.
    4. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    5. Langlais, Eric, 2009. "les criminels aiment-ils le risque ? [Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?]," MPRA Paper 14892, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "Competition Policy With Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead Of “Per Se Rules Vs Rule Of Reason”," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 215-244.
    7. G. Dari Mattiacci & G.G.A. de Geest, 2004. "The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules," Working Papers 04-17, Utrecht School of Economics.
    8. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.
    9. Tim Friehe & Murat C. Mungan, 2021. "The political economy of enforcer liability for wrongful police stops," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 141-157, February.
    10. Zhixin Dai & Fabio Galeotti & Marie Claire Villeval, 2017. "The efficiency of crackdowns. An experiment in public transportations," Post-Print halshs-01335686, HAL.
    11. Suurmond, Guido, 2007. "The effects of the enforcement strategy," MPRA Paper 21142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Leshem, Shmuel & Tabbach, Avraham, 2023. "The option value of record-based sanctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 1-22.
    13. Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2016. "Law Enforcement in a Federal System: On the Strategic Choice of Sanction Levels," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 73-103.
    14. Friehe, Tim & Miceli, Thomas J., 2015. "Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 105-112.
    15. Boyd, Colin, 2020. "Revisiting the foundations of fare evasion research," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 313-324.
    16. Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.
    17. Hans-Bernd Schäfer, 2008. "Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 72-75, March.
    18. Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series dp472, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    19. Lars Hansen & Signe Krarup & Clifford Russell, 2006. "Enforcement and Information Strategies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 45-61, July.
    20. Bonaventura, Luigi & Orlando, Danilo, 2007. "Enforcement of Regulation, Irregular Sector, and Firm Performance," MPRA Paper 14686, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Zoltán Szücs, 2024. "Economie du policing – le cas d’une police de tranquillité publique, la nouvelle police municipale de Paris," EconomiX Working Papers 2024-15, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.

  6. Henrik Lando, 2002. "When is the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Optimal?," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 27(4), pages 602-608, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2006. "Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives," Cahiers de recherche 0633, CIRPEE.
    2. Louis Kaplow, 2017. "Optimal Multistage Adjudication," NBER Working Papers 23364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Edwige Fain, 2017. "Standard of proof and volume of litigation: A comparative perspective," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(4), pages 2434-2445.
    4. Louis Kaplow, 2012. "On the Optimal Burden of Proof," NBER Working Papers 17765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Giorgio Di Maio & Donato Masciandaro & Margherita Saraceno, 2020. "Are Bankers "Crying Wolf"? The Risk-Based Approach to Money-Laundering Regulation and its Effects," Working Papers 444, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2021.
    6. Louis Kaplow, 2017. "Optimal Multistage Adjudication," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 613-652.
    7. Lando, Henrik & Mungan, Murat C., 2018. "The effect of type-1 error on deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 1-8.
    8. Louis Kaplow, 2011. "On the Optimal Burden of Proof," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(6), pages 1104-1140.
    9. Louis Kaplow, 2011. "Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 277-280, May.
    10. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2005. "Deterrence versus Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(2), pages 193-206, June.
    11. Shmuel Leshem & Geoffrey P. Miller, 2009. "All-or-Nothing versus Proportionate Damages," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 345-382, June.
    12. Matteo Rizzolli, 2016. "Adjudication: Type-I and Type-II Errors," CERBE Working Papers wpC15, CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics.
    13. Drugov, Mikhail & Troya Martinez, Marta, 2012. "Vague Lies: How to Advise Consumers When They Complain," CEPR Discussion Papers 9201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  7. Lars Jebjerg & Henrik Lando, 1997. "Regulating a Polluting Firm Under Asymmetric Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(3), pages 267-284, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian Elleby & Frank Jensen, 2018. "How Many Instruments Do We Really Need? A First-Best Optimal Solution to Multiple Objectives with Fisheries Regulation," IFRO Working Paper 2018/05, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.

  8. Lando, Henrik, 1997. "An attempt to incorporate fairness into an economic model of tort law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 575-587, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Friehe, Tim & Pham, Cat Lam, 2021. "Accident avoidance and settlement bargaining: The role of reciprocity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    2. Ram Singh & Francesco Parisi, 2010. "The Efficiency Of Comparative Causation," Working Papers id:2681, eSocialSciences.
    3. Lando, Henrik, 2000. "The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter," Working Papers 2000-7, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
    4. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Henrik Dan Lando should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.