On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs
Abstract: We argue that enforcement costs, ignored in the literature on ‘efficient breach’, are important for the choice of contract breach remedy. Empirically we find that specific performance is almost never claimed in Civil Law countries. It involves forcing a party in breach to perform actions while damages involves extracting only a monetary payment. The former is more difficult and more coercive. We study enforcement rules of Denmark, France and Germany. Enforcement of specific performance is absent in Denmark and weak in France. In Germany it seems stricter, which points to the importance of costs of enforcement to the claimant.
|Date of creation:||01 May 2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, A5, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark|
Phone: +45 3815 3815
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/finance/
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- Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995.
"Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment,"
NBER Working Papers
5007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June.
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