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Public Outcry and Police Behavior

Author

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  • DeAngelo Gregory
  • McCannon Bryan C.

    (Center for Free Enterprise, Department of Economics, West Virginia University, 1601, University Ave, #326, Morgantown, WV 26506, USA)

Abstract

Numerous empirical studies have documented policing behavior and response to public opinion, social norms, changing laws, neighborhood context and a litany of other subject areas. What is missing from this literature is a general theoretical framework that explains the conflicting goals of properly applying the law and responding to social norms and the consequences of the law. We build a theoretical framework where law enforcement officials care about both reputation and performance. Outside evaluations assess the quality of the decision making of the officers, but can be influenced by strategic challenging of the sanctioning by the suspected violators. We first establish that reputational concerns can distort law enforcement, encouraging either over-enforcement or under-enforcement of the law, depending on the prior beliefs of violations and the observed signal. Introducing strategic challenging by the violator eliminates over-enforcement and allows for an even larger reduction in application of the law by less-skilled officers. Connections to empirical findings of distortions in law enforcement, along with an extension to deterrence are highlighted.

Suggested Citation

  • DeAngelo Gregory & McCannon Bryan C., 2016. "Public Outcry and Police Behavior," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 619-645, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:16:y:2016:i:2:p:619-645:n:13
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0101
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benson, Bruce L & Rasmussen, David W & Sollars, David L, 1995. "Police Bureaucracies, Their Incentives, and the War on Drugs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 21-45, April.
    2. SIDDHARTHA BANDYOPADHYAY & BRYAN C. McCANNON, 2015. "Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(2), pages 219-256, April.
    3. Henrik Lando, 2006. "Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 327-337, June.
    4. Tim Friehe, 2008. "Correlated payoffs in the inspection game: some theory and an application to corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 127-143, October.
    5. BRYAN C. McCANNON, 2011. "Strategic Offsetting Behavior: Evidence From National Collegiate Athletic Association Men'S Basketball," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(4), pages 550-563, October.
    6. Tsebelis, George, 1989. "The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 77-91, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gregory DeAngelo & Matthew Gomies & Rustam Romaniuc, 2023. "Do civilian complaints against police get punished?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 453-482, September.
    2. DeAngelo, Gregory & Owens, Emily G., 2017. "Learning the ropes: General experience, task-Specific experience, and the output of police officers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 368-377.
    3. Gregory DeAngelo & R. Kaj Gittings & Amanda Ross & Annie Walker, 2016. "Police Bias in the Enforcement of Drug Crimes: Evidence from Low Priority Laws," Working Papers 16-01, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    4. DeAngelo, Gregory & Humphreys, Brad R. & Reimers, Imke, 2017. "Are public and private enforcement complements or substitutes? Evidence from high frequency data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 151-163.
    5. Gregory DeAngelo & Bryan C. McCannon, 2020. "Psychological game theory in public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 159-180, January.

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