When is the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Optimal?
This paper defines the preponderance of the evidence standard and establishes it as a benchmark, optimal under certain idealized conditions. The main conditions are: only efficiency matters (not fairness); people are risk–neutral; sanctions are socially cost–free; and a suit may be brought even if no violation of the law has occurred. Concerning the definition of preponderance of the evidence, a distinction is made between standards based on probability of guilt and standards based on the evidence. It is stressed that the latter does not include ex ante information concerning the offender’s type, and should hence not be associated with a probability of guilt in a Bayesian sense. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance (2002) 27, 602–608. doi:10.1111/1468-0440.00195
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Volume (Year): 27 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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