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Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework. Comment

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  • Hans-Bernd Schäfer

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  • Hans-Bernd Schäfer, 2008. "Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 72-75, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200803)164:1_72:cjramd_2.0.tx_2-n
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, 2008. "Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 52-67, March.
    2. Lando, Henrik & Shavell, Steven, 2004. "The advantage of focusing law enforcement effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 209-218, June.
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