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A Simple Model Of Repression And Revolt In Autocracies Applied To The Arab Spring

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  • MARIO GILLI

    (Department of Economics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milano, Italy)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide a specific point of view on the protests that have characterized the Arab countries from December 2010 and are still going on. To understand some of the reasons behind these events, I propose a sequential game with asymmetric information on the likelihood of having a successful uprising. This means that on one hand the government choices may signal the true state of nature and on the other hand the citizens' choices are a way to learn the truth. I assume specific parameters' values to obtain a full characterization of the set of equilibria. This allows to show the interaction of three main factors in determining the possible resulting political regimes: the country's wealth, the autocratic institutions and the general political mood. The complex interaction of these three variables explains why apparently heterogeneous countries may have similar political processes and apparently similar countries face different political situations.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Gilli, 2012. "A Simple Model Of Repression And Revolt In Autocracies Applied To The Arab Spring," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(04), pages 1-29.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:14:y:2012:i:04:n:s0219198912400051
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198912400051
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Roland Hodler, 2018. "The Political Economics Of The Arab Spring," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 821-836, April.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Tarek A. Hassan & Ahmed Tahoun, 2018. "The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt’s Arab Spring," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(1), pages 1-42.
    3. Joao Ricardo Faria & Peter McAdam, 2013. "From Social Contract to Arab Spring: Macroeconomic Adjustment under Regime Change," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0813, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    4. Faria, João Ricardo & McAdam, Peter, 2015. "Macroeconomic adjustment under regime change: From social contract to Arab Spring," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-22.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Protest; repression; autocracy; D74; N45;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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