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A Model of Chinese Central Government: the Role of Reciprocal Accountability

  • Mario Gilli

    ()

  • Yuan Li

Why was the same state in China able to promote economic growth in the reform era but not in the previous thirty years? In this paper we focus on a speci c aspect that might help the search for a comprehensive explanation: the speci c institutional arrangement that induced autocratic government to adopt growth-enhancing policies. To this aim, we consider a standard political agency model (Besley, 2006) where the incumbent leader may be either congruent or not, and where both types need the support of the ‘selectorate’ to hold on to power. Our main result is that in autocracies without electoral discipline, to restrain the opportunistic behavior of a leader, the size of the ‘selectorate’should be intermediate: if too small, the ‘selectorate’is captured by the leader and has no disciplinary role; if too big, the leader’s incentives are diluted.

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File URL: http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper230.pdf
File Function: First version, 2013
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Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 230.

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Length: 35
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision: Feb 2013
Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:230
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  1. Eric Maskin, 2003. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Timothy Besley & Masayuki Kudamatsu, 2007. "Making Autocracy Work," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 48, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  3. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521855266 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1996. "China's transition to markets: market-preserving federalism, chinese style," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 149-185.
  5. Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, . "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," Working Papers 97045, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  6. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
  7. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. "The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 889-906, August.
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