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Downward accountability in response to collective actions

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  • Yuan Li

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  • Yuan Li, 2014. "Downward accountability in response to collective actions," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 22(1), pages 69-103, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:22:y:2014:i:1:p:69-103
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilli Mario & Li Yuan, 2012. "Citizenry Accountability in Autocracies: The Political Economy of Good Governance in China," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-6, December.
    2. Yang Yao & Nancy Qia & Monica Martinez Bravo & Gerard Padro i Miquel, 2011. "Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China," Working Papers id:3931, eSocialSciences.
    3. Huang,Yasheng, 1996. "Inflation and Investment Controls in China," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521554831, September.
    4. Mario Gilli & Yuan Li, 2013. "A model of Chinese central government," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 21(3), pages 451-477, July.
    5. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    6. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
    7. Mario Gilli & Yuan Li, 2013. "A Model of Chinese Central Government: the Role of Reciprocal Accountability," Working Papers 230, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2013.
    8. Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
    9. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, September.
    10. Zhang, Xiaobo & Fan, Shenggen & Zhang, Linxiu & Huang, Jikun, 2004. "Local governance and public goods provision in rural China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2857-2871, December.
    11. Kung, James Kai-Sing & Chen, Shuo, 2011. "The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 27-45, February.
    12. Chen, Ye & Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Relative performance evaluation and the turnover of provincial leaders in China," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 421-425, September.
    13. Wang, Shuna & Yao, Yang, 2007. "Grassroots Democracy and Local Governance: Evidence from Rural China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 1635-1649, October.
    14. Gehlbach, Scott & Keefer, Philip, 2011. "Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 123-139, June.
    15. Shih, Victor & Adolph, Christopher & Liu, Mingxing, 2012. "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 166-187, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mario, Gilli & Yuan, Li, 2018. "Transitions and Political Stability in Autocracies. The Role of Public Perception," Working Papers 383, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 13 Jul 2018.
    2. Fang, Hanming & Hou, Linke & Liu, Mingxing & Xu, Lixin Colin & Zhang, Pengfei, 2023. "Political survival, local accountability, and long-term development: Evidence from an authoritarian country," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 15-40.
    3. Hanming Fang & Linke Hou & Mingxing Liu & Lixin Colin Xu & Pengfei Zhang, 2019. "Factions, Local Accountability, and Long-Term Development: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 25901, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Gilli, Mario & Li, Yuan, 2015. "Coups, revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 109-124.
    5. Qi Wang & Mengdi Liu & Jintao Xu & Bing Zhang, 2023. "Blow the Lid Off: Public Complaints, Bargaining Power, and Government Responsiveness on Social Media," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 85(1), pages 133-166, May.
    6. Fisman, Raymond & Lin, Hui & Sun, Cong & Wang, Yongxiang & Zhao, Daxuan, 2021. "What motivates non-democratic leadership: Evidence from COVID-19 reopenings in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).

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