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Happy citizens trust their rulers

Author

Listed:
  • Youxing Zhang

    (Zhejiang University
    University of Leeds)

  • Peter Howley

    (University of Leeds)

  • Clemens Hetschko

    (University of Leeds
    Freie Universität Berlin
    CESifo)

Abstract

Using Chinese panel data, we examine whether citizen well-being impacts the formation of political trust, which is key to regime stability. Through a quasi-experimental method, we demonstrate how an improvement in subjective well-being directly leads to increased political trust. In a supplementary analysis, we also demonstrate how low political trust is predictive of actions that undermine regime stability. These findings suggest that any government, even an authoritarian one, has an incentive to foster the happiness of its citizens.

Suggested Citation

  • Youxing Zhang & Peter Howley & Clemens Hetschko, 2025. "Happy citizens trust their rulers," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 38(3), pages 1-28, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:38:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s00148-025-01120-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00148-025-01120-4
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • P35 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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