A Demand Adjustment Process
The aspiration approach to cooperative games, which has been studied by a number of authors, including Cross, Turbay, Albers, Selten and Bennett, presumes that players in a game bargain over their reservation prices, or aspirations. A number of aspiration-based solution concepts have been put forth, and aspiration solutions have been connected to non-cooperative bargaining models. Missing in this approach has been theory of how aspirations themselves arise. The present paper is an attempt to fill this gap. It describes a very general demand adjustment process, using the framework of set-valued dynamical systems developed by Maschler and Peleg. This demand adjustment process always converges; sufficient conditions are given in order that it converge to an aspiration, and that it converge in a finite number of steps.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 26 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm|
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moulin, H, 1990. "Cores and Large Cores When Population Varies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 219-32.
- Sharkey, W.W., 1993. "A Characterization of Some Aspiration Solutions with an Application to Spatial Games," Papers 95, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Eyal Winter, 1993.
"Core Implementation and Increasing Returns to Scale for Cooperation,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
289, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Winter, Eyal, 1994. "Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 533-548, November.
- Suzanne Scotchmer and Greg Engl., 1992.
"The Core and the Hedonic Core: Equivalence and Comparative Statics,"
Economics Working Papers
92-197, University of California at Berkeley.
- Engl, Greg & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1996. "The core and the hedonic core: Equivalence and comparative statics," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 209-248.
- Elaine Bennett, 1986. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," UCLA Economics Working Papers 594, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Bennett, Elaine & Wooders, Myrna, 1979. "Income distribution and firm formation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 304-317, September.
- Bennett, Elaine & Zame, William R, 1988. "Bargaining in Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 279-300.
- Benny Moldovanu & Eyal Winter, 1990. "Consistent demands for coalition formation in NTU games," Discussion Paper Serie B 147, University of Bonn, Germany.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1998:i:4:p:423-438. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.