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A Demand Adjustment Process

  • William R. Zame

    (Department of Economics, University of California, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024, USA)

  • Michael Maschler

    (Department of Mathematics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)

  • Elaine Bennett

    (Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic & State University, USA)

The aspiration approach to cooperative games, which has been studied by a number of authors, including Cross, Turbay, Albers, Selten and Bennett, presumes that players in a game bargain over their reservation prices, or aspirations. A number of aspiration-based solution concepts have been put forth, and aspiration solutions have been connected to non-cooperative bargaining models. Missing in this approach has been theory of how aspirations themselves arise. The present paper is an attempt to fill this gap. It describes a very general demand adjustment process, using the framework of set-valued dynamical systems developed by Maschler and Peleg. This demand adjustment process always converges; sufficient conditions are given in order that it converge to an aspiration, and that it converge in a finite number of steps.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 26 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 423-438

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1998:i:4:p:423-438
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  1. Moulin, H, 1990. "Cores and Large Cores When Population Varies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 219-32.
  2. Sharkey, W.W., 1993. "A Characterization of Some Aspiration Solutions with an Application to Spatial Games," Papers 95, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.
  3. Moldovanu, Benny & Eyal Winter, 1993. "Core Implementation and Increasing Returns to Scale for Cooperation," Discussion Paper Serie B 289, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Suzanne Scotchmer and Greg Engl., 1992. "The Core and the Hedonic Core: Equivalence and Comparative Statics," Economics Working Papers 92-197, University of California at Berkeley.
  5. Elaine Bennett, 1986. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," UCLA Economics Working Papers 594, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Bennett, Elaine & Wooders, Myrna, 1979. "Income distribution and firm formation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 304-317, September.
  7. Bennett, Elaine & Zame, William R, 1988. "Bargaining in Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 279-300.
  8. Benny Moldovanu & Eyal Winter, 1990. "Consistent demands for coalition formation in NTU games," Discussion Paper Serie B 147, University of Bonn, Germany.
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