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Bank Runs: Theories and Policy Applications

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  • Ettore Panetti

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  • Ettore Panetti, 2016. "Bank Runs: Theories and Policy Applications," Economic Bulletin and Financial Stability Report Articles and Banco de Portugal Economic Studies, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:ptu:bdpart:e201609
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    1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.
    2. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    3. Ettore Panetti, 2017. "A Theory of Bank Illiquidity and Default with Hidden Trades," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(3), pages 1123-1157.
    4. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Goldstein, Itay & Leonello, Agnese, 2018. "Government guarantees and financial stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 518-557.
    5. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2012. "Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader's Guide," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(1), pages 128-150, March.
    6. Carla Soares & Diana Bonfim & Nuno Alves, 2016. "Surviving the perfect storm: the role of the lender of last resort," Working Papers w201617, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    7. Nathan Foley-Fisher & Borghan Narajabad & Stéphane Verani, 2020. "Self-Fulfilling Runs: Evidence from the US Life Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(9), pages 3520-3569.
    8. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000077, UCLA Department of Economics.
    9. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 50-55, May.
    10. Gorton, Gary, 1988. "Banking Panics and Business Cycles," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(4), pages 751-781, December.
    11. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
    12. Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, 2005. "Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1293-1327, June.
    13. Andrew J. Jalil, 2015. "A New History of Banking Panics in the United States, 1825-1929: Construction and Implications," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 295-330, July.
    14. Mattana, Elena & Panetti, Ettore, 2014. "A dynamic quantitative macroeconomic model of bank runs," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014068, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Arifovic, Jasmina & Hua Jiang, Janet & Xu, Yiping, 2013. "Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2446-2465.
    16. Cooper, Russell & Ross, Thomas W., 1998. "Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 27-38, February.
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